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Introduction 
Universal human rights have largely been a creation of the last century. While documents 
like the Magna Carta brought about the concept of absolute, limiting standards initially, and the 
American Declaration of Independence may have asserted that all men are born with inherent 
rights, it was not until the years following World War II that rights were officially formulated 
and said to be held by all people. The international desire to ensure that citizens were protected 
from abusive governments meant that power had to be transferred from the states to international 
institutions; this was a primary responsibility of the newly formed United Nations (“U.N.”). The 
United Nations continues to be a global agent that champions the defense of individual human 
rights and seeks to maintain the international norms of treatment. To this day, the defining 
document governing these standards is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), 
initially signed in 1948. The charter, in its initial articles, states: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other states. Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.1 
The UDHR lists a multitude of rights, not all of which are clearly defined and many of which 
will not be discussed in the context of this paper. Nevertheless, the initial articles of the UDHR !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 UN General Assembly resolution 217A, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, Art. 1-2, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  
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represent the essential claims of the charter, and the very basis for the framework of international 
human rights.  
Universal human rights are not valuable in themselves; they are valuable as a means to 
the end of human dignity. Societies create rights as a practice in order to protect that dignity. 
They are entitlements that every human possess, and necessary limitations on all other actors. 2  
As such, rights exist as both a constraint on behavior and a claim that individuals have on the 
international community, which has pledged to secure them.3 
There are several key points, derivative of the UDHR, which must be considered in any 
discussion of international human rights and responsibilities. First, these rights are pervasive and 
fundamental; as all humans have dignity, all have rights that exist to promote said dignity. 
Second, they are also transnational.4 This is the point most clearly articulated in the preamble to 
the UDHR: states are not the basis of international human rights. While these rights may be 
defined in international charters and incorporated into domestic legal systems, they are not 
dependent on them for legitimation. The human rights of a person would continue to exist, even 
if her state fails.5 Third, they are inviolable. Rights are necessary constraints on any national or 
international action. They exist as a primary obligation that must be guaranteed at all costs. One 
cannot infringe upon these rights for the sake of other social goods or values; they are necessary 
side constraints on action and must be treated as such. It is the final aspect of international 
human rights that will be the topic of this paper.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights: Third Edition, (Cambridge: Westview, 2007), 40. 
3 Beitz, Charles R. The Idea of Human Rights. (New York: Oxford, 2009), 65.  
Beitz’s work will be discussed in depth later in this paper. 
4!Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights, 39.!
5 This would not seem to follow with Donnelly’s definition of human rights as a practice. One could easily argue 
that human rights are contingent upon a state, and that while human dignity may continue to exist despite the failure 
of a government, human rights would not. Because of the creation of international charters that ensure human rights 
across borders, this is not the case. Despite originating in agreements between states, human rights now exist above 
any such associations.  
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Given that the international community has sought to define and guarantee human rights 
for almost seventy years, how is it possible that human rights abuses continue to be ignored and 
tacitly tolerated in the global arena? What justifications of human rights best represent the 
current global framework, and what is the optimal means to protect human rights on the 
international scale? Is there a way for society to overcome its current lack of enforcement and 
move forward?  
In order to best consider these questions, this paper will be split into two primary 
sections. First, it will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of three popular theories that explain 
the justifications for and obligations associated with international human rights. In contemplating 
these arguments, this paper will seek to frame a theory that could be practically used to 
legitimate and uphold human rights. The second part of this paper will discuss the International 
Criminal Court, and the means by which the young institution could play a role in ensuring 
global standards on the treatment of individuals. This section will consider the history and goals 
of the Court with respect to human rights, and evaluate its theoretical and practical impacts on 
the global community. This paper will conclude by making recommendations on the future of the 
International Criminal Court based on this analysis.  
Yet, before considering the various theories of international human rights, it is necessary 
to articulate three distinct assumptions. 
Firstly, this paper will assume that human rights exist. Indeed, it would seem foolish to 
dedicate a large portion of this discussion to a topic that a) has already been studied and 
discussed thoroughly by a great deal of literature, both historically and contemporarily, and b) 
that is commonly accepted by international society as a whole. This paper will consider the 
justifications of international human rights as a facet of the various theories and the obligations 
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that generate from each, but it will not seek to prove that human dignity or human rights exist in 
a vacuum. The near-universal acceptance of the UDHR and the effort of states and international 
organizations to define, protect, and uphold these rights is enough to reasonably assume that 
human rights are at least an entrenched social construction, if not something more.6 At this point, 
as rights can be applied not only as a result of the bevy of multilateral agreements but also as 
global customary law, it seems reasonable to state that these rights do exist, and that global 
society is committed to protecting them. 
Next, this paper will focus mainly on the abuse of negative human rights. There are 
several different reasons for this decision. Primarily, negative rights are necessary prerequisites 
to any other rights, and must be secured before attempting to ensure rights of lesser importance. 
It seems reasonable that a state that facing genocide, unable to guarantee the physical safety of 
its citizens, would not concern itself with the protection of economic and social rights. In the 
same way, the international community must seek to prevent the most egregious human rights 
abuses first. These abuses of negative rights represent the most pressing threat to the dignity of 
global citizens, and undermine rights as a whole if not upheld. In truth, states must concern 
themselves with cementing these rights before considering implementing any others.  
Furthermore, negative rights are the only truly universal standards, as they are the only 
rights that can be fully defined and agreed upon. This statement appears inconsistent at the start, 
as the UDHR guarantees a multitude of different rights. However, in practice, many of these 
rights are contingent upon domestic laws and preferences. The rights articulated in the UDHR 
are so extensive that even liberal governments fail to guarantee them in full. For those nations 
that do seek to enforce the entire doctrine, the UDHR is broad enough to allow for different !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This point is similar to Beitz’s justification for rights as a practice; they exist because we say that they exist, and 
that is sufficient. Beitz’s theory will be discussed at length later in this section. 
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methods of enforcement.7 Negative rights act as a constant and necessary side constraint to all 
legislation, and it is difficult to say that positive rights cannot be denied or overruled given 
certain circumstances, especially as they can be tremendously difficult and expensive to enforce.8 
Some would say that it is dangerous to define positive rights as rights in any way, as their 
legitimate denial could justify the infringement of more important norms.9 
One must also question the autonomy of democracies: the UDHR and most other 
doctrines of human rights dictate that all citizens must have some form of effective voice in their 
government.10 If the body of citizens votes to deny a positive right, is that not a legitimate 
exercise of its right to self-determination? Would not forcing an entitlement on a culture that did 
not want it not infringe upon their democratic rights? As most would say that the right to affect 
government comes before any positive undertaking, it seems reasonable to say that positive 
rights cannot be fully guaranteed by international institutions. 
Finally, this paper will only consider systematic infringement of human rights. Thomas 
Pogge explains the significance and definition of these abuses in his “How Should Human Rights 
Be Conceived?” He writes, “[H]uman-rights violations, to count as such, must be in some sense 
official […]  Human rights can be violated by governments, certainly, and by government 
agencies and officials, by the general staff of an army at war and probably also by the leaders of 
a guerrilla movement or of a large corporation –but not by a petty criminal or a violent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 These different guarantees, including the rights to “medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control” could be interpreted in any number of different ways, and would have to be 
guaranteed based upon the social and political goals of the population. 
UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Art. 25, Sec.1. 
8 Any of the services listed in the footnote above, along with the rights to “rest and leisure, including reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay” would put an economic strain on the government of a 
nation, and would have to be funded through additional revenue, which would be unrealistic for many state regimes. 
UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Art. 24. 
9 Sunstein, Cass, “Against Positive Rights: Why social and economic rights don’t belong in the new constitutions of 
post-Communist Europe,” East European Constitutional Review 2, no. 1 (1993): 36, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/eeurcr2&div=12&g_sent=1&collection=journals. 
10 UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Art. 21. 
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husband.”11 In determining whether or not an act constitutes a breach of international human 
rights, it is important to consider the actor and the responsible parties. A series of illegitimate 
killings by a government of its own or another states’ citizens would constitute a human rights 
abuse, as it would represent a breach of obligation to international doctrine on the part of that 
government. On the contrary, a string of murders by a serial killer would be an atrocity, but 
would not in itself constitute an abuse of human rights. Yet, if a government fails to enact or 
uphold laws that prevented murder, it would be liable for the actions of this killer, despite the 
fact that it would not have committed the crime on its own. This paper will focus on the conduct 
of official actors and the enforcement mechanisms to promote human rights within states, rather 
than the crimes of individuals. 
 
Chapter One: The Differing Theories of Human Rights 
Human rights can and have been justified and framed in any number of ways. While 
many of these theories originate in similar ideas and manifest themselves to enforce the same 
rights, their fundamental differences lie in the obligations that individuals and particularly 
governments draw from them. As a result, any conversation of international human rights must 
entrench itself in one or more of these theories, as each necessarily dictates certain duties 
associated with rights. 
This section will start by considering the theories of international cosmopolitanism, as 
initially described by Kant but justified and updated by the work of contemporary thinkers. It 
will then describe a more libertarian justification for international accountability with regard to 
human rights, as detailed by Thomas Pogge. Finally, it will analyze Charles Beitz’s two-level !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Pogge, Thomas, “How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?” in The Philosophy of Human Rights, ed. Patrick 
Hayden (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001), 192. 
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system, which exists as a median between the two theories. These arguments will lead to a 
conclusion that will serve as the basis for Chapter Two, and the discussion of the International 
Criminal Court. 
 
Section One: Kant, Habermas, and Cosmopolitanism 
 The cosmopolitan theory of international human rights, originating in the work of 
Immanuel Kant, bases itself firmly in the assumption that all humans are inherently equal, and 
come out of the state of nature to form a community. Kant details in his “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” the means by which humans formed commonwealths out of 
the state of nature, and the means by which the state of nature continues to exist amongst states 
in their relations with one another.12 Just as humans bound themselves to the government in 
order to escape the original state of nature, Kant finds it rational that, after many generations of 
fighting between states, humans would remove themselves from the perpetual struggle and unite 
to form a global federation of nations. This global government would end the fighting between 
people, as all would be guaranteed the same liberties and would work toward the flourishing of 
the whole.13 With respect to the final end, Kant writes “a feeling seems nonetheless to be already 
stirring among all its members who have an interest in the preservation of the whole, and this 
gives rise to the hope that, finally, after many revolutions of reform, nature’s supreme 
objective— a universal cosmopolitan state, the womb in which all of the human species’ original 
capabilities will be developed.”14 Kant believed that it was reasonable for humans to come 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This argument represented his view of nations in 1784, but continues to represent a belief of realist thinkers in the 
present time. 
13 Kant, Immanuel, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” in Perpetual Peace and other Essays 
on Politics, History, and Morals, ed. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), Kindle Edition, locations 787-
99. 
14 Ibid.!
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together across nations in order to limit one another, as war would cease to exist and humans 
would seek to limit themselves as a benefit to the freedom of all.  
Yet, it is obvious that cosmopolitanism, in its purest form, creates a tremendous demand 
upon the international political community, and would require a significant departure from the 
current system. As a result, Kant also sought to provide for a practical means to achieve this 
cosmopolitan ideal; he determined a plan to create such an international association in his 
“Perpetual Peace”.15  
 The practical form of Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal is described in three parts. First, every 
nation would create a republican form of government that would provide its people with a voice 
in the political process of the state. Second, there must be an international legal body that would 
oversee the administration of rights to all people and would hold nation states accountable. 
Third, there must be an extension of rights to all individuals, whether or not they are attributable 
to a state that guarantees such rights.16  
 In relation to Kant’s demands for global society, the current international regime appears 
to be moving towards some aspects of cosmopolitanism. First, let us consider democracy and 
self-rule in today’s global society. Kant argued that republicanism based itself in freedom, 
mutual dependence, and equality, and thus was the best means to organize a government. Jürgen 
Habermas further explains this necessity in the protection of human rights when he writes, 
“[H]uman dignity is associated with the status that citizens assume in the self-created political 
order. As addressees, citizens can come to enjoy the rights that protect their human dignity only 
by first uniting as authors of the democratic undertaking of establishing and maintaining a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace”. in Perpetual Peace and other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, ed. 
Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), Kindle Edition, location 2553. 
16 Ibid, locations 2448-585.!
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political order based on human rights.”17 Habermas claims that the realization of human dignity 
is brought about in the creation of rights by equal beings in a democracy. Thus, ideally, as 
humanity moves towards a cosmopolitan existence, state governments would move towards 
democracy. Yet, it is difficult to a large degree to determine the democratic makeup of nation 
states around the world. While only four governments openly admit they are undemocratic (one 
being the Vatican), over one hundred states do not have full democracies. The governments of 
these nations rule over half of the world’s total population.18 Thus, even though the world is 
officially trending towards democratic governments in most nations, it remains unclear how 
many citizens actually receive democratic rights. If equal citizenship is not the basis of a state’s 
legal obligations, then does the nation respect the equality of its people? While Kant and 
Habermas would seem to argue that democracy is a necessary qualification of any state that 
respects rights, there are liberal thinkers who would disagree.19 It also seems important to 
recognize that even many non-democratic nations have officially ascribed themselves to the 
UDHR. The declaration guarantees not only basic human rights but also the right to 
representation within one’s government, which entails that these nations value representation and 
the input of their people, at least officially.  
 The international legal body is also a complicated matter. Kant articulates, “A league of a 
special sort must therefore be established, one that we can call a league of peace (foedus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17!Habermas, Jurgen, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” Metaphilosophy 
41, no. 4 (2010): 473, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01648.x/asset/j.1467-
9973.2010.01648.x.pdf?v=1&t=hfxx01g4&s=c24778350bd496111198a98e61aabc5d4d3794fa.!
18 “Democracies of the World,” NobelPrize.org, accessed January 12, 2013, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/peace/democracy_map/. 
This statistic is based on the idea that nations who limit the political access of individuals or who face significant 
corruption in the political process would not be considered “full democracies”. 19!UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Art. 21, Sec. 1. All individuals are guaranteed a “right to take part in the 
government of his county, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. !
This idea is supported by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples. In his work, Rawls legitimizes a theoretical 
government with a “consultation hierarchy”, in which some individuals are not able to hold office within a state, but 
have their rights respected and are able to have their voices heard by rulers and legislators. 
Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard, 2001), 71-8. !
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pacificum), which […] seeks to end all wars forever. This league does not seek any power of the 
sort possessed by nations, but only the maintenance and security of each nation’s own 
freedom.”20 Theoretically, the United Nations would serve as this body. It exists as a 
collaborative organization built to “maintain international peace and security”.21 It seeks not only 
to act in this manner on the level of nations but also on the level of individuals. The U.N. could 
be a multilateral check against inhumane treatment by state actors. However, as is evident by the 
continued atrocities across the globe, it is in practice at very least unsuccessful. The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, while able to hear cases that are referred by marginalized 
individuals across the globe, has only seen a fraction of the total cases of abuse and crimes 
against humanity. Even when the committee hears cases, their responses to them are limited and 
unenforceable. Geoffrey Robertson sees this fact as a over-arching flaw with not only the Human 
Rights Committee but with the U.N. as a whole: as a multilateral body in which almost all 
nations take part, the organization is hesitant to alienate any one of its members through public 
denunciations and sanctions.22 The second section of this paper will consider the International 
Criminal Court as a potential remedy to this problem, but regardless, it appears that the current 
world is far off from the Kantian ideals of a world government or a global federation.  
 The third qualification dictates that all individuals will be guaranteed rights regardless of 
their legal citizenship. Kant refers to this practice as the “cosmopolitan right to universal 
hospitality”.23 He argues that an individual who entered another county, while able to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, locations 2532-35. 
21 UN Conference on International Organization, “Charter of the United Nations,” June 26, 1945, Art. 1, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. 
22 Robertson details, “The Human Rights Commission met for a few weeks each year, riven by bloc-voting and by 
the refusal of member states to allow themselves or other member states to be criticized. It resolved at its inception 
in 1947 that it had ‘no power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human rights’ – a resolution 
which pretty much summed up its impact over the next twenty years. 
Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, (New York: New Press, 2000), 39. 23!Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, location 2553. 
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legitimately turned away, could not justly be harmed. He finds that the world, while large, is not 
infinite, and that humans necessarily need to interact. There is no natural reason that these 
humans should be unequal. As a result, the connection to humanity is a person’s most important 
association. The globe was a universal community of people first, and a divided collection of 
nations second. As a result, people were due certain respect. It is easy to see how contemporary 
human rights find their foundation within the bounds of this cosmopolitan ideal. If humanity is 
the fundamental association of persons across the globe, then each individual is a necessary, 
equal part, and must be respected at all costs. This respect is based on being as a human, not as a 
result of citizenship in a particular state. Governments do not create and confer rights upon their 
constituents; they are created to protect rights that exist a priori to any political affiliation. Kant 
sums the interdependence of humans perfectly when he writes, “Because a (narrower or wider) 
community widely prevails among the Earth’s peoples, a transgression of rights in one place in 
the world is felt everywhere; consequently, the idea of cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and 
exaggerated, but rather an amendment to the unwritten code of national and international rights, 
necessary to the public rights of men in general.”24 
It is clear that the functional basis for the present order of international human rights lies 
within the framework of global cosmopolitanism, but it is important to consider the necessary 
facets of a truly cosmopolitan society and the resulting responsibilities for states. Robert Fine 
describes the ideal state when he writes, “It looks to the construction of an ideal cosmopolitan 
condition in which human rights are for the ﬁrst time legislated through a global parliament, 
adjudicated through a network of world courts, and enforced through a U.N. army and police. Its 
vision is of a wholly legalised international order in which human rights ﬁnally trump the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24!Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, location 2575-87.!
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exercise of power.”25 While it would not seem to be the case, an ideal global society would be 
tremendously different than any current approximation. The responsibilities with regard to 
human rights transcend governments on all levels; the duty to one another is borne out of the 
obligatory association of human beings.26 This is a significant departure from the current system, 
in which citizens are promised rights ascribed to humanity as a whole, but are nevertheless 
dependent upon the state governments themselves to enact and enforce these norms. In a 
cosmopolitan world, the focus on the individual takes a primary role in the creation of 
international legislation and action. State authority becomes secondary, while humanity exists as 
the most important concept. Thus, the primary responsibility for the protection of international 
human rights transfers from domestic to global actors. However, there are several problems with 
this notion of human rights. 
 First, a cosmopolitan view of international human rights is impractical. Any global 
human rights regime, whether a true world government or only an overarching check on the 
states, would have to exist above the agreements between national bodies, as these actors would 
be universally subject to its jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is necessary, as international 
institutions must protect individuals despite any failures by the citizens’ own governments.27 
However, the obligations that such a system would create would be completely untenable.  
 As an actual system of global government seems somewhat far-fetched, let us consider a 
system of universal jurisdiction that exists above the traditional international structure. As long 
as human rights are being violated, individuals and states are infinitely responsible to assist. If all 
humans are obligated to promote the dignity of all others, any infringement on rights would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25!Fine, Robert. “Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights: Radicalism in a Global Age,” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 1 
(2009): 17-8, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.bc.edu/store/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01566.x/asset/j.1467-
9973.2009.01566.x.pdf?v=1&t=ha34mi5u&s=91b753ea8cbe790636d3eeaddafa5e5c4c64ccf3.!26!Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” 478-9.!!
27 Ibid. 
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necessitate action on the part of the rest of the world, irrespective of state boundaries or other 
political affiliations. It is easy to see the problems that such a system creates. On one hand, the 
use of force to promote human dignity would be constantly tainted with the notions of realist 
politics. International human rights could and would be used as a justification to enter a state, 
with or without the sovereign’s permission, and to take over for other motives.28 On the other 
hand, the obligation on the part of all people and states would create such a great number of 
responsibilities that inaction would become the norm; actors would constantly assume that 
someone else could and should act instead of them. Each state would agree that the end of human 
rights is valuable, but no actor would believe that it should be the one to give things up in order 
to enforce these goals that everyone wants. This problem with international actors calls to mind 
the folk tale of the little red hen, in which the other animals refuse to assist the hen in the making 
of the bread, but each desire to feast on the finished product. Even if states can agree that norms 
ought to be upheld at all costs, each is unlikely to act in such a way. In this case, there would be 
dire consequences: if states cannot be compelled to uphold human rights norms internationally, 
then the norms cease to exist. 
 The infinite obligation also complicates the matter of citizenship and rights within a 
nation. The cosmopolitan theory of human rights dictates that all people are fundamentally equal, 
regardless of the rights that a state offers. Yet, not all states offer the same rights and privileges 
to their own nationals. Each person may belong to the larger group of humanity, but 
simultaneously belongs to a state as a citizen. State A may have different responsibilities to its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Žižek, Slavoj, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, (New York: Verso, 2002), 94. Žižek describes the way in which 
military force pervades all aid when he writes, “We thus no longer have the opposition between war and 
humanitarian aid: the two are closely connected; the same intervention can function on two levels simultaneously: 
the toppling of the Taliban regime is presented as part of a strategy to help the Afghan people oppressed by the 
Taliban – as Tony Blair said, perhaps we will have to bomb the Taliban in order to secure food transportation and 
distribution.” 
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citizens than State B has to its people. Barring a special agreement, State A does not owe 
anything positive to the citizens of State B. If there is a positive international obligation to 
uphold human rights, however, State A must contribute to the maintenance of human dignity in 
all nations. While such obligations between humanity might be reasonable in the case of a world 
government, the competing obligations pose a serious problem. If a nation is functionally 
obligated to uphold international human rights, and must undertake humanitarian intervention in 
order to do so, where does its obligation to humanity end and obligation to citizens begin? Can a 
just government risk the rights and lives of its own citizens to secure the rights of others? The 
interaction between these things brings about a striking utilitarian calculus. If the decision is 
truly based in cosmopolitan theory, then the citizens are moral equals. Any calculation is a 
simple one for one. If the government of State A believes that it can save 1,000 lives in State B 
in a humanitarian intervention while only losing 999 citizens, it is obligated to undertake such 
act.29 But if states do owe their citizens additional rights and respect, then they must calculate the 
number of citizens they are willing to risk for the sake of humanitarian assistance. How many 
citizens of State A are worth 1,000 citizens of State B? The calculus becomes dehumanizing and 
difficult. Citizens of other cultures are relegated to status as a number, or a fraction of national 
citizens. The very existence of states within this system creates an untenable combination of 
obligations for international actors. Either the international body must have the power to protect 
all of these rights on its own, or the states must be compelled to act in such a way outside of their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29!Such a calculus calls to mind the arguments of Peter Singer. In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, he argues that 
as long as people are starving in nations across the world, people of affluence (anyone who is not starving) are 
required to assist. The extreme form of his argument says that individuals are obligated to assist until they are at the 
level of the people they have help. The less extreme form dictates that individuals are required to do so until they 
must give something “morally significant” up to help. 
Singer, Peter, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 767.  
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own interests. It is easy to see that this is not the case in the current political environment, and 
this problem persists as an impediment to a cosmopolitan state.   
 
Section Two: Thomas Pogge and Libertarian Institutionalism 
Thomas Pogge, in his essay “How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?” seeks to avoid 
the problems of cosmopolitanism while still imposing positive obligations to prevent the harm of 
individuals. Pogge creates an institutional model that bases itself on an understanding of human 
rights as “unrestricted moral concerns”, acting as absolute constraints on action for the sake of 
the good of others.30 While his moral argument would appear to imply a certain philosophy or an 
appeal to the natural laws of a deity, Pogge separates himself by arguing that rights have been 
secularized, and are now based in the notion of humanity. This interpretation fits well with the 
previous assumption that rights are claims upon others, as those claims are attributable to an 
individual, not to a God.31  
Pogge argues that the transition from natural rights to human rights has changed not only 
the theoretical basis of these rights, but has significantly altered the way in which society must to 
consider and respond to violations of these standards. This argument is perhaps the most unique 
part of Pogge’s essay. Human rights, having departed from a foundation in absolute Truth or a 
God, now find their basis in the people and must be upheld by the governmental institutions that 
protect those people. As a result, the individuals and institutions that hold power in a society are 
the actors responsible for upholding the law, and thus it is these “official” violations that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Pogge, “How Should Human Rights,” 188-9. 
31 Ibid, 190. Pogge also calls upon the arguments Gewirth in this discussion, explaining that rights do not necessarily 
have to be claimed to exist and to demand respect. He provides the example of a man in a coma, who is obviously 
unable to protest to violations of his person, remains a holder of rights, as he would have had the ability to protest 
otherwise.! 
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represent the true abuses of human rights.32 Pogge further describes this point when he writes, 
“We can capture this idea by conceiving it to be implicit in the concept of human rights that 
human-rights postulates are addressed, in the first instance at least, to those who occupy 
positions of authority”.33 In Pogge’s interpretation, rights are not truly violated in the action of 
one citizen against another, but by the act of a power-holding official within a society against a 
citizen. Yet, in the case of a violation from one citizen to another, the government becomes 
responsible if it has not taken sufficient precautions to ensure that such rights are protected for all 
citizens.34 Therefore, if some private citizens abuse the dignity of others by capturing and 
torturing them, this would not be considered a true violation of human rights, so long as the 
government is seeking to end this abuse. Yet, if the government did not have a provision that 
outlawed torture, despite the guarantee based on the UDHR that such actions are inexcusable, the 
acts of these private citizens could be attributed to the government as a failure to uphold 
obligations, and thus could be viewed as human rights violation.35  
 The views that Pogge puts forth with regard to the basis of rights and the means by which 
governments and other agents can violate those rights are completely reasonable, and will be 
largely accepted as a foundation for the Chapter Two of this paper.36 Pogge’s interpretation of 
the basis of rights is largely reflected in the institutional model put forth by Charles Beitz, which 
is the topic of the next section and the model that this essay will eventually settle on. This paper 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Ibid, 192. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 While, theoretically, it may appear difficult to draw a line between what constitutes a “true” violation of human 
rights under Pogge’s model, it is relatively easy to see the way in which his ideas reflect the realities of our world. 
Human rights abuses most commonly attributed to governments or to other organized movements. Despite the 
potential impact of a lone serial killer running rampant within a country, we as third party observers are unlikely to 
deem his murders “violations of human rights” unless the government in that country was openly allowing him to do 
so. It is the people who hold power in society that have the ability to cause the most significant abuses or to allow 
such abuses to go on unabated; it is thus these individuals who are responsible for the maintenance of human rights.  
36 These arguments are largely reflected in the third assumption in the introduction to this paper. 
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also assumes, based on Pogge’s arguments, that violations of human rights are in some way 
official, and will discuss in detail what “official” entails in specific contexts.37 While these 
foundational arguments are strong and important, Pogge’s view on how best to uphold human 
rights in this framework remains too uncertain to fully embrace.  
 Pogge places the burden of responsibility of promoting human rights on the citizens of 
society, as the government derives its authority from the general population.38 As representatives 
of the people are the executors of official government acts, these actions can be attributed to the 
general population. Pogge describes that most abuses occur not because governments are unable 
to adequately promote rights or protect citizens from harms, but rather because they do not 
dedicate sufficient resources to these issues. He explains that violations are a result of 
circumstances “when the people, who bear the ultimate responsibility for what happens on their 
society’s territory, do not care enough about the objects of human rights to enable, encourage 
and (if need be) replace or reorganize their governments so as to safeguard secure access to these 
objects for all.”39 In many situations, the government violates rights or tolerates the abuse of 
rights because the people at large remain indifferent to any injustices occurring. This reasonably 
implicates all citizens of a nation as complicit in violations of human rights, and as a result, 
demands action on the part of all participating individuals. 
 Pogge argues that there are negative demands on citizens to curb official violations of 
human rights. Basic negative obligations, those demands not to violate the rights and selves of 
others, seem obvious, even to those outside of the society. Yet, in the context of Pogge’s model, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 While many of the situations referred to the ICC have been perpetrated by non-government agents, all represent 
“official” abuses, as they are committed systematically by a group of people.  
38 Pogge, “How Should Human Rights,” 198. A government generating power from citizens presupposes a 
democratic constitution, but as Pogge dictates, a focus on human rights from the citizenry effectively demands a 
focus on the part of the government. This reality is most notable in democratic societies, as governments who does 
not adhere to the wishes of the body politic is likely to be voted out in the next election cycle, but exists in all 
constitutions, as citizens can revolt against or overturn and unresponsive regime.  
39 Ibid. 
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the obligation extends past the refraining from acts that would harm others directly, dictating that 
citizens must refuse to participate in institutions or social orders that violate rights. Pogge 
explains that while it would technically fulfill one’s obligation to remove oneself from the 
society entirely, it is more reasonable to interpret this demand as the duty to positively attempt to 
change the structures within a society that create injustices.40  
 Pogge’s model demands that citizens try to correct the institutional injustices present 
within their society. Individuals, as the true foundation of their government and social 
institutions, share the responsibility for those institutions with the government itself. Thus they 
are obligated to attempt to correct harmful institutions and social structures, as they would 
otherwise remain complicit and responsible for the abuse of human rights. What is unique about 
Pogge’s model is that it only obliges the citizens to attempt to overturn social injustices to fulfill 
their obligation, not to actually do so. Pogge recognizes social reform as a monumental task, and 
therefore will not condemn those seeking change, despite the fact that they may fail in doing 
so.41 Furthermore, societies are also not responsible for what they cannot realistically achieve. To 
use the example of the serial killer, if a government did not have sufficient law-enforcement 
officers to capture the killer without allowing an equal or greater number of people die in the 
process, we could not claim that said government was committing a human rights violation, as 
they could not effectively prevent the loss of life.42 Finally, Pogge argues that it is not the duty of 
the citizens to seek to uphold the rights directly, but rather to impact the government and to 
change the institutions that jeopardize those rights in the first place.43 Thus, in a state where 
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40 Ibid, 203, 210. This obligation, while universal, is not uniform. Those with more resources, education, or power 
within society have more extensive positive responsibilities than those without such advantages. Positive obligations 
in this sense are correlated heavily with social position. 
41 Ibid, 205 
42 Ibid, 204. 
43 Ibid, 203. 
19 
 
millions starve to death, citizens are not obligated to provide the people with food, but to reform 
the institutions that allow for starvation to happen. While his model is a unique and ascribes 
reasonable obligations to the international community, there are several issues with Pogge’s 
arguments that make it impossible to prefer his system of human rights. 
 First, Pogge fails to adequately apply his model to an interconnected international 
society. He claims that states and national societies are the basis of his model, but that it can be 
expanded to the international system through the participation in “the network of international 
law and diplomacy, international commodity markets, etc.”44 Through international law and 
human rights, citizens are universally connected to the rest of humanity, which would seem to 
create the infinite obligation between individuals, and therefore condemn Pogge to the struggles 
faced by advocates of cosmopolitanism.45 One could go so far as to say that the connection based 
on international law is a necessity given international human rights. Otherwise, a self-sufficient 
and isolated state would be able to act in whatever way it wished, and no outside actor would 
have an obligation to assist its abused people.    
Yet, even if the problem of interconnectedness could be solved internationally, the means 
by which citizens would be obligated to reform institutions remains uncertain. Clearly, the 
citizens would be required to seek change in the international arena, but how could they 
effectively do so? It seems unreasonable, in theory and practice, to believe that international 
actors would overthrow state regimes whenever human rights are not guaranteed. Third party 
states have no standing to overthrow governments they do not participate in, and even if they 
could justify their actions, most would be unable to bear the social and economic costs of 
constant interventions. Despite the inability of states to act unilaterally, one could argue that it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Ibid, 209.  
45 Ibid, 203. Pogge limits this problem slightly by dictating that it is only well-off individuals in society that would 
be required to act, but it remains an issue.  
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would be sufficient to create international institutions meant to encourage states to promote 
rights. At this point, there are there are a variety of international actors (the U.N., NGOs, etc.) 
that were built for that specific purpose. While the creation of these institutions may fulfill state 
obligations under Pogge’s model, the lack of jurisdiction and support amongst international 
actors makes it impossible for these organizations to affect real change. While citizens may share 
a common humanity and common rights with individuals across the globe, a means to 
significantly alter abusive governments through international institutions, as Pogge describes, 
does not appear to exist. 
Finally, there are times when direct aid is necessary, and may be a more effective means 
of providing assistance than institutional reform. Pogge argues, “On the institutional, unlike the 
maximalist account, it involves no duty to help supply such necessities to those who would 
otherwise be without them. It rather involves a duty on citizens to ensure that the social order 
they collectively and coercively impose upon each of themselves is one under which each has 
secure access to these necessities”.46 However, there remain times when individuals across the 
world require food, shelter, or freedom from violence. In these circumstances, direct aid is a 
necessity, and ought to be an obligation beyond the changing of institutions.  
In the long run, it may be necessary to put structures in place that will guarantee the 
protection of rights for all citizens internationally, and it may, in fact, be our duty to help create 
these institutions. Yet, to say that we our not obligated to protect a group of people who suffer 
from genocide now seems ridiculous, so long as we are seeking the end of human dignity. 
Tolerating injustice now directly contradicts these long-term goals, and thus we must seek to end 
these abuses as part of any interpretation of an international obligation to promote human rights. 
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46 Ibid, 203. 
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Pogge’s theory of institutionalism within society is theoretically sound, but fails to 
translate fully from the concept of citizens within a state to citizens internationally. In addition, 
the focus of citizens on changing structures in the global arena seems misplaced, as there are 
many current institutions that seek to fulfill this end, and states retain at least some 
independence. Finally, Pogge also denies the idea of an obligation for direct aid, which allows 
harms to occur in the short run for the sake of long-term gains. For these reasons, we cannot use 
Pogge’s institutional model as the basis of our arguments in the international system.  
  
Section Three: Charles Beitz and The Practice of Human Rights 
The final model this paper will consider is a variation on the two-level system proscribed 
by Charles R. Beitz in The Idea of Human Rights. Beitz rejects the notion of a moral stance as a 
necessary justification for human rights in this work. Instead, he refers to the history and 
development of human rights in contemporary society as the basis for his theory on international 
standards. He claims that, while continuing to emerge in the years following World War II, 
human rights have become an elaborate international practice and have become self-justifying. 
Due to the importance of Beitz’s model to the rest of this essay, I will consider both his 
arguments and the contentions against him in great detail. 
Beitz’s model is both political and institutional: it bases itself in the power of the 
conclusions society has reached on human rights and the charters and institutions that have been 
built to support those conclusions. This section will begin with an overview of Beitz’s 
description of “the practice”, as described by his work. As the practice does not find its power in 
a moral theory, this paper will then proceed to consider how states were able to create these pre-
political standards through their authority as international actors. After showing how this was 
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possible, I will turn to the rights themselves, and provide several reasons that Beitz’s model is 
the most appropriate basis for any discussion on international human rights. Finally, this essay 
will consider several critiques of Beitz’s model, particularly those based in naturalistic theories 
of rights, and will show why the practical system of human rights remains preferable over other 
justifications of international standards.  
The notion of international human rights as a practice dictates that their value is created 
based upon the influence of agreements that claim that they are valuable. For the majority of the 
last century, states and their governments have sought to determine and enforce standards that 
would prevent atrocities like the Holocaust from occurring again. International actors, including 
both states and the multinational institutions that they have created, have decided that there are 
certain norms for the treatment of human beings that must be upheld at all costs. They have 
contended that rights are valuable and that there must be a consistent international effort to 
protect them. These rights are relevant as a historical necessity, stemming from the atrocities and 
response to those events, a statement of the near universal values in today’s society, and a 
necessary collection of demands upon some actors and constraints on others. Taken merely as 
claim, these arguments are reasonably standard and with regards to human rights, seemingly 
reflecting the preamble of the UDHR. Yet, the primary question with regard to Beitz’s theory 
remains: what makes these claims true?  
Beitz explains that widespread practice of seeking standards for human treatment, both in 
doctrine and in action, justifies human rights. He elaborates: 
“[T]he practice exists: it is elaborate both doctrinally and politically, it consumes a 
considerable amount of human and other resources, and people tend to regard its norms 
with great seriousness. If the focus of critical interest is the idea of human rights as it 
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arises in public reflection and argument about global political life, then it seems self-
evident that we should take instruction from the public practice in conceptualizing central 
terms.”47 
Beitz’s contention finds its power in reality rather than theory. The notion of human rights, 
irrespective of any particular moral grounding, affects the actions of people and governments all 
over the world. Rights are a valuable and relevant impetus for action because, in practice, the 
global community chooses to act on them. NGOs seek to alleviate starvation and disease that 
threaten the right to life. Countries like the United States have undertaken humanitarian 
interventions and even wars to prevent dictatorial abuses on populations. World governments 
have spent ten billion dollars on the creation of an International Criminal Court, which seeks to 
prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations and attempts to prevent future abuses.48 
Any ideal that brings about such responses amongst international actors is innately valuable, as it 
is evident that people will make significant sacrifices to protect it. It is fair to say at very least 
that society has determined to value human rights in the same way it has chosen to value gold or 
money: while their value may not be quantifiable in a vacuum, outside of the current context, 
they function as important stimuli for action in society. Their existence in the current world 
drives action and brings about tangible responses from the world population. It is difficult to say 
this institutional value is less real or true than any philosophical claims of inherent standards.  
 Despite the rationality of Beitz’s basic argument, there remain many questions, practical 
and theoretical alike, on the foundation of this practical system. First off, is it reasonable to say 
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47 Beitz, Idea, 11. 
48 Obviously this is the topic of Chapter Two of this paper. The ICC is a practical attempt to curb genocide and the 
abuses of human rights across the globe, but it doubles as a statement of the lengths the international community 
will go to promote human rights across the globe.!!
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that a collection of nations could create standards that are internationally binding, particularly for 
nations that have not submitted to such standards?  
 To begin, states constantly create mutually binding international agreements. The nature 
of treaty law enables the creation of such standards. States determine settlements that they 
believe will benefit their people, and when these agreements are enacted into treaties, they 
become binding for the states that submit to them.49 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
and other regional courts have the power to the mandate performance of these treaties in wake of 
a violation or a failure to uphold. States that commit violations can be forced to adhere or to pay 
reparations for their unjustified actions. These treaties create functional laws for states, and 
standards of human rights can act in the same way.50 The obvious response against this argument 
is that treaties are only binding for the nations that have agreed to them, and thus that 
international agreements on behalf of human rights are doomed to fail.51 But despite a lack of a 
universal consensus on the UDHR, it is fairly easy to understand principles of human rights as 
customary law.52  
 Common or customary law can be applied to states if a certain action or standard is a 
‘general’ practice.53 Peter Malanczuk depicts the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties as the most notable example of an international charter that can reasonably be applied as 
customary law.54 If most states have or would agree to a certain standard or practice, then non-
submitting states can be bound to that practice. It would be difficult to say that human rights is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised Edition (New York: 
Routledge, 1997): 38.!
50 Ibid. 
51 The logic to this argument would follow: states that would agree to claims of human rights already uphold them; 
states would abuse them would desire to violate would simply not adhere, and thus would not be subject to 
restrictions. 
52 It is also worth noting at this point that there is a near-unanimous consensus on the UDHR itself; albeit with 
reservations both officially and practically. 
53 Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction, 42 
54 Ibid, 40. 
25 
 
not a general practice at this point, given the continued focus on the promotion of human dignity 
in the international arena. Furthermore, as the collection of nations in the U.N. denounces those 
in violation of human rights norms, it appears as if there is a strong international consensus 
towards the promotion of rights.  
That is not to say that customary law is necessarily the practical answer to the protection 
of rights in the international sphere. Customary law stemming from the Fisheries case between 
Norway and the United Kingdom protects the “persistent objector”, even in wake of customary 
law.55 Applied to the current issue, those states that have continued to abuse rights without 
denunciation or action by other states would be continually allowed to do so. Such actions would 
erode a universal consensus based on customary law, and would require something more. There 
are also practical concerns regarding the promotion of human rights through customary law. It 
would be incredibly difficult for the ICJ to attempt to demand adherence to human rights norms. 
Cases would have to be brought by governments against violating states, and it would be chaotic 
for the court to attempt to hear and rule upon every potential violation. These problems would 
not seem to be particularly destructive to the notion of human rights applying as customary law, 
but do represent practical concerns with the current model. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to 
say that nations can realistically create mutually binding human rights norms, despite problems 
with enforcement through the ICJ.56 
On the topic of justification, there is an additional point worth noting: the domestic 
justification of laws further supports the enactment of standards internationally. Democratic 
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55 “Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway),” in IN/PO521 International Law Casebook, ed. Hiroshi Nakazato, 
(Chestnut Hill: BC Press): 2012, 32-4. The Fisheries case was ruled upon by the ICJ in 1951. While the United 
Kingdom argued that Norway could not extend its fishing zone beyond the traditional distance from shore, the ICJ 
found that Norway had the right to do so, as Norway had acted in this way for many years without objection, and 
were thus exempt from customary law based on their status as a “persistent objector”.   
56 Enforcement through the ICC could also help to solve some of these issues. 
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states derive their power, at least technically, from the collection of the people. The authority of 
the state is based upon this social contract theory, and the authority of international 
collaborations between nations would reasonably stem from the same jurisdiction.57 Citizens 
give authority to a government to make laws, to exact punishments, and to enter into foreign 
relations that it believes will benefit the whole. Why could a collection of governments, working 
as a unit, not make laws that apply to all of their people?58 
 Given that it seems it is possible for states to create international standards, let us 
consider the rights themselves. There are two important arguments to consider in support of the 
practical model. Beitz espouses one foundational argument, which endorses the idea of practice 
and sets up the political sphere that follows in his work. He claims that it is preferable to 
consider human rights within his institutional model because of the nature of rights as claims 
upon others. As was noted in the brief discussion at the beginning of this paper, rights exist not 
only as limits on the action that outsiders could undertake against a person, but are also 
entitlements that can be demanded by human beings. If a human right is defined and guaranteed 
to a citizen, there must be an agent or agents that said citizen could call upon if that right is 
violated. There is an indispensible political interaction that exists in wake of this association. 
Political actors are thus relevant factors in any discussion of human rights, as these actors are 
required to guarantee the security of said rights.59 Attempting to apply a moral theory of rights 
denies this connection, and demands that international actors serve an undue end. Beitz 
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57 Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government, Gutenberg Ebook, section 89, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm. Locke writes, “this is done, wherever any number of men, 
in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or 
else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes 
the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall 
require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due.” 
58 Indeed, any theoretical problems with this idea would have to be discussed through a conversation on 
international relations, and would require states to commit to isolationist policies. 
59 Beitz, Idea, 65. 
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condemns the focus on less practical theories during this discussion, claiming that the concern 
for an accessible moral theory diverts focus from the more important issue of action.60 
Second, justifying human rights based upon institutional consensus avoids the most 
important question with regard to rights: their theoretical foundation. Beitz explains, “Human 
rights are like natural rights in being critical standards by whose content is not determined by the 
moral conventions and legal rules of any particular society, but they are unlike natural rights in 
not presupposing any one view about their basis or justification.”61 The practice of human rights 
does not need to worry why the international community or a particular culture desires to uphold 
the right to life, only that they do. This aspect of Beitz’s conception prevents problems like those 
found in cosmopolitanism, which may be inclusive as a moral theory but becomes untenable 
once applied to global society, and can be derailed by any number of philosophical arguments. 
The flexibility of Beitz’s argument is both his theory’s greatest strength and its greatest 
weakness. Founding his justification for human rights on the institutional practice of states 
allows for actors to consider the standards behind human rights in whatever way they please, as 
the practice of human rights only seeks to determine what can be commonly held. Beitz’s theory 
combines the philosophical and political spheres, and thus is the most easily applicable to any 
practical system of human rights. Yet, the ability to determine human rights communally also 
places a tremendous amount of responsibility on international actors. If nations and charters 
create rights, can they not be taken away just as easily?62 
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60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, 54. 
62 Geuss, Raymond, History and Illusion in Politics, (New York: Cambridge, 2001), 150. Geuss writes, in reference 
to international institutions seeking to promote human rights, “As far as we can judge on the basis of the available 
historical and sociological knowledge, any such system will always in fact be something provisory, and the barriers 
themselves will not be absolute.” 
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Questions of legitimacy must be raised. Why can international charters dictate that 
persons are “free and equal in dignity”?63 Why can a collection of nations, formed as a political 
association, create something that they claim is evident as pre-political? If human rights are a 
result of certain historical and institutional processes, could these institutions change and could 
the current approximation of human rights become defunct?64 Despite Beitz’s extended 
conversation on the topic within The Idea of Human Rights, it is this conclusion that remains 
most uncertain.65  
John Tasioulas, in defense of naturalistic theories of human rights, calls into question the 
rationale behind self-justifying charters and organizations. While this paper has already had a 
significant discussion on the ability of actors to create institutions, Tasioulas rejects the claim 
that such legal rights can be legitimated absent comparable moral standards. He refers to these 
moral standards as “genuine human rights” and argues that the conversation ought to be had in 
two separate spheres: one in which we determine what rights we have morally and another that 
considers the problem of enforcement institutionally.66 
The distinction between the moral and political aspects of Tasioulas’ argument is a 
significant departure from the institutional model. Rights are no longer valuable because society 
dictates them to be so; they are valuable because they comply with absolute dictates of moral !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Art. 1. 
64 Tasioulas, John. “The Moral Reality of Human Rights”, paper presented at Philosophy Seminar, All Souls 
College, Oxford, UK, March 2003, 1. 
http://www.c3mundos.org/files/Tasioulas%20(2004)%20The%20Moral%20Reality%20of%20Human%20Rights.pd
f. The author references the “popularity” of human rights in the institutional model. There are several aspects of this 
argument to consider. In general, the historical trend of human rights has always been to extend rights, not to 
obscure them. Consider the proliferation of economic, social and rights by proxy in the current political climate. If 
we are concerned with popularity, it would seem that our guarantees will continue to become more expansive rather 
than less. Next, even if we assume that rights have some distinct moral foundation, they remain fully at the mercy of 
the popularity of rights in terms of enforcement. If rights are not a concern, they become effectively violable, just as 
an unenforced speed limit would be. 
65 Beitz, Idea, 72. Beitz admits that he cannot totally refute naturalistic theories, but does call them into question and 
provide advantages to the practical model, which are discussed in the coming pages. 
66 Tasioulas, “Moral Reality,” 1. 
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treatment. Thus an individual right is either morally right or morally wrong, with little room for 
debate. The delineation of rights in this way solves every problem of legitimacy: rights are moral 
and pre-political, and the institutional model is a practical means of upholding them. Rights 
could never justly become unpopular or unevenly distributed, as they are only manifestations of 
true moral standards.67  
Why, then, ought we still prefer Beitz’s model as the basis for discussion of international 
human rights? Leaving the questions of legitimacy up for debate seems foolish if there is a 
reasonable means to solve it. A.D. Etinson’s critique of The Idea of Human Rights puts such a 
discrepancy on display. He explains that Beitz’s attempt to derail naturalistic arguments is 
shallow and futile, failing to account for modern theories like that of Tasioulas and eventually 
settling very close to their conclusions.68 Why not combine the two theories? Etinson goes so far 
as to say that Beitz could have reasonably admitted that naturalistic theories drive the 
institutional model he creates and be no worse off.69 While this paper will agree that conceptions 
of naturalistic theories may influence the decision making of international actors and the creation 
of institutional standards of international human rights, there are several reasons emanating from 
Beitz’s theory that prevent this from being a plausible option.  
First, moral rights are inherently exclusive: choosing a theory of rights naturally excludes 
all others and leaves no room for debate. Such theories dictate objectively that certain rights are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Ibid, 2. Tasioulas references the “legal rights of slave-holders”. This example represents a rogue international 
regime in the context. A moral right would never justify a group of international actors tearing down standards of 
the right to freedom from torture or slavery. Advocates of institutional rights, while recognizing that such a situation 
is highly improbable, must concede that it is possible.  
68 Etinson, Adam Daniel, “To Be or Not To Be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights,” review of The 
Idea of Human Rights, by Charles Beitz, Res Publica 16 (June 2010): 442-4, doi: 10.1007/s11158-010-9121-3.  
69 Ibid, 447. Etinson states, “[I]f Beitz were to have openly acknowledged this, then he could have waded more 
deeply and less self-consciously into the question of what human interests, needs, or values serve as appropriate 
grounds for human rights, and what epistemological mechanisms may reliably allow us to discover what these are. 
This would have improved the explanatory and critical power of his position, as well as opened one of the potential 
avenues of philosophical contribution to the modern practice of human rights”. 
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valuable and that others are expendable. There are several problems with this conception. The 
traditional argument is that it is impossible to come to a universal consensus on a moral theory. 
As Michael Freeman notes, “unfortunately, there are no uncontested philosophical foundations 
of human rights”.70 Coming to any form of consensus on a moral theory is unlikely, and brings 
about a constant debate with regard to the philosophical merits of said theory. It seems foolish to 
base any political approximation, particularly when it will require action, in a theory that will 
remain constantly questionable.  
In addition, determining a particular moral theory also brings about questions of cultural 
imperialism. If one moral theory is to be the basis of all human rights, then that moral theory 
must be imposed over all others.71 As such it is necessary to enforce this particular moral theory 
on the rest of the world, despite any differing opinions. Furthermore, the value of the consensus 
on individual rights does not strengthen the rationale behind the particular right; each right is 
either objectively valid or not based upon the outside moral constraints. Beitz’s model allows 
different cultures to justify rights in their own way, and generates its legitimacy from the general 
consensus and agreements created as a result. Those in the Abrahamic traditions could justify the 
right to life based upon the Ten Commandments, while secular authorities who value the 
autonomy of the individual have the ability could legitimate it based upon the undue coercive 
power of one over another.72 A distinct set of moral norms could be an influencing factor or a 
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70 Freeman, Michael, “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights,” in Human Rights Quarterly 16 (1994): 
511. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hurq16&div=29&g_sent=1&collection=journals 
71 This concern is frequent even in contemporary human rights conversations. Many argue that human rights 
represent an inherently Western ideal, and believe that their universality is unjustly imposed on the rest of the world. 
Ignatieff, Michael, “The Attack on Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (2001): 105, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20050331.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
72 It is important to note the difference between the consensus of nations and international actors in Beitz’s practical 
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justification for an international actor in the discernment of human rights, but such norms are not 
themselves the justification for the practice of human rights. The creation of the UDHR and other 
human rights treaties emerged from a variety of moral traditions; each of which may have had 
different rationales in support of a particular right.73 Basing theory in the reality of human rights 
as a practice may bring about questions of philosophical legitimacy, but it is clear that all 
theories of moral justification face similar struggles, and Beitz’s theory provides a reasonable 
basis for the universal imposition of such standards. 
 The practical responsibilities connected to rights also provide a reason to prefer the 
institutional system of justification. While this paper has already discussed the necessary 
political interaction generated by the notion of rights as claims on actors in the international 
political sphere, the ability to enforce moral norms in naturalistic theories must also be 
addressed.74 If we conceive of international human rights as practical conditions, rather than 
something emanating from an exact set of moral rules, rights become self-enforcing; they can be 
seen as both normative standards and political obligations. On the contrary, justifications of 
human rights based on a particular philosophy can only exist as a side constraint or a means to 
judge political standards of human rights. Beitz explains by reasoning that natural theories “treat 
the question of the authority of human rights as internal to the question of their nature: once we 
understand what human rights are, we understand the range of considerations that determine the 
content of international human rights doctrine and explain why we should care that it be adhered 
to.”75 While we may be able to argue that these moral standards exist, the way they should be 
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imposed on international society continues to be uncertain. Under the practical model, 
international human rights combines the concerns of authority and legitimacy, as the creation of 
rights by the collection of international actors simultaneously dictates the standards they are 
forced to uphold.  
Finally, natural rights are fully dependent on the context that they exist in, giving them 
the same weaknesses as the any practical conceptions of rights. Proponents of naturalistic 
theories can claim that, in a vacuum, their theory would stand against an international 
community that decided to allow torture. If torture is morally wrong, then it is wrong regardless 
of the context. Yet, in practice, rights must be interpreted, justified, and guaranteed through 
social institutions. Moral norms are relative to the context they exist in, and while Tasioulas 
argues that natural rights are distinct from the legal rights, like those of slaveholders in the 
1800s, he neglects to recognize that laws protecting slaveholders were a result of moral 
conditions that did not grant rights to personal autonomy and liberty to all citizens.76 Naturalistic 
theories can point now to such abuses and say, “These were wrong”, but they do so based on a 
current interpretation of morality. They are wrong in 2013, but who is to say what will be wrong 
in 2113?77 Morals have the ability to change just as institutional standards do, and as no rational 
being will ever be able to point to a theory that is definitively correct, it seems that the 
interpretation of morality becomes a fact relative to the society that exists at any particular time.  
Tasioulas, in the discussion of his natural theory, seemingly admits this weakness, 
conceding that the interpretation of natural rights is at very least somewhat based upon social 
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order. He writes, “[T]oday, human rights are those possessed in virtue of being human and 
inhabiting a social world that is subject to the conditions of modernity.”78 He considers the 
institutional enforcement mechanisms and modern interpretations of rights as a part of his moral 
theory, albeit claiming that his justification exists separately. Beitz further derails this point by 
calling all naturalistic interpretations of specific rights into question, arguing that they may 
instead originate in an individual’s “more abstract right to be a member of a society”.79 But even 
as a member of society, individuals are at the mercy of interpretations of morality in whatever 
global regime they live in. As the actual manifestation of rights is transient based upon current 
beliefs on morality, naturalistic theories remain subject to a similar problem of legitimation 
practical theories face: they remain debatable and subject to context.  
While naturalistic theories still have their merits, these three questions significantly 
debase such theories, and help to recognize the advantages in the implementation of practical 
idea of human rights. While somewhat uncertain at the start, a closer examination reveals the 
both the practical and theoretical strengths to Beitz’s argument, particularly when focusing on 
international human rights as a series of standards that must be upheld rather than a nebulous list 
of human dues. But where does this fact leave us? Yes, we can conceptualize human rights in the 
practical sense, but in what responsibilities and systems does Beitz’s model of human rights 
create for states and international actors? 
Beitz puts forth the theory of the two-level system as a means of promoting human rights, 
which divides the responsibility for the maintenance of human dignity between the states, the 
primary actors, and the international community, the secondary actors. This theory emerges out 
of respect for domestic authority, as the state and state government are formally responsible for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Tasioulas, “Moral Reality,” 2. 
79 Beitz, Idea, 72. 
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the protection of citizens through any interpretation of the social contract and are the basis of all 
international agreements and institutions.80 Yet, Beitz recognizes the genuine importance of 
human rights in the current model, and thus generates a system that will seek to respect human 
rights for the people of all states, even if a primary actor is unable to do so.81 
 In order to determine the circumstances in which states and other actors are required to 
assist or intervene in the protection of human rights, Beitz begins by conceptualizing human 
rights as standards meant to protect the “urgent individual interests” of citizens, which he defines 
as “[those] that would be recognizable as important in a wide range of typical lives that occur in 
contemporary societies: for example, interests in personal security and liberty, adequate 
nutrition, and some degree of protection against the arbitrary use of state power.”82 States under 
Beitz’s two-level system are required to protect the lives, liberty, and dignity of their citizens in 
three ways. First, states may not violate rights in their official actions. This is the easiest standard 
to interpret, as it is clear that a state purge like that of the Stalinist government in Russia would 
constitute a breach of human rights law. Second, the state must protect citizens from those 
threats that can be reasonably predicted from the outside world. The United States, in this sense, 
would not have been considered liable for the failure to protect citizens from the December 7, 
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, given that there was no way to expect an attack in that form, and 
the military took reasonable precautions for the expected sabotage from the Japanese. However, 
if a government that was aware of a potential invasion did nothing to mobilize troops, establish 
barriers or use other means to prevent this act of aggression, it could be considered a violation of 
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the rights of its people. Finally, states are required to aid the victims of depravation within their 
boundaries. If there are starving or otherwise oppressed people within a state, the government 
has the obligation to assist them, seeking to alleviate their situation to the best of the state’s 
ability.83 It seems reasonable to say that Beitz’s description of urgent human interests is at very 
least similar to the list of negative rights that were discussed in the introduction to this paper, and 
those that make up the basic tenants of most state constitutions. State governments have the first 
duty to protect these rights, whether through direct legislation or by ensuring the compliance of 
non-state agents to international standards.84 
 However, if there is a failure on the part of the state to adequately protect the rights of 
citizens, the international community must to react in support of the maligned citizens. While the 
two-level system and many other justifications of human rights are built specifically to react in 
this situation, lest rights be officially disrespected and questioned across the globe, such 
circumstances remain the most divisive in international politics. States can be prone to settle on 
issues of self-interest when asked to provide more than an affirmation of human dignity. 
According to Raymond Geuss in his work History and Illusion in Politics, the current situation 
of rights equates mostly to what rights people deserve to hold and the corresponding desire for 
structures that would allow the international community to protect those rights.85 Although 
Geuss makes a convincing point about the current predicament of the global political system, he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Like in Pogge’s argument, it is necessary to limit any of these demands on the state to those that the state could 
legitimately achieve. A poor government in a third world country may not have the resources available to provide a 
fully realized police force to prevent a series of murders, and may not have the means to provide food to starving 
citizens at all. It is for this reason that the standard of legitimacy and justice is dependent on context, and also reason 
that the international community necessarily needs a two-level system. 
84 Beitz, Idea, 114. 
85 Geuss, History and Illusion, 144.  
“To say that all humans have a natural of human right to self-determination, although the Indonesian government 
effectively prevents various groups in the archipelago from determining for themselves how they wish to live, means 
that we think the Indonesians ought to allow some groups to determine their own political life and wish there were a 
mechanism which could be invoked to ensure this outcome. But of course, there is not, and the powers-that-be in 
Indonesia know that there is not – that is the assumption of the whole train of thought.”!
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provides no reason that the international community necessarily has to continue with such 
passivity. Institutions have been created to promote rights internationally, and with the proper 
support, they have the ability to be successful. If rights are to be guaranteed globally, as the 
international community has proclaimed consistently over the last 65 years, these claims must 
finally be supported by action.  
 Beitz explains that the international community could reasonably support the states 
failing to adequately protect human rights in three different ways.86 First, states can hold other 
states accountable directly, demanding compliance with international charters and standards in 
place or imposing sanctions and other restrictions until such obligations are fulfilled. If the 
United States or other powerful countries restricted trade with states refusing to respect human 
dignity, it could be a powerful impetus for those states to correct their practices.87 Second, states 
across the globe could directly assist nations that cannot meet standards of treatment. This type 
of response would seemingly be reserved for states that are simply unable to provide sufficient 
safeguards for citizens, as opposed to those that are actively violate the rights of their people. 
Nevertheless, there is at times a need for additional resources, particularly when the lives of 
individuals are threatened by starvation or by non-governmental violence. Finally, Beitz notes 
that direct intervention, if it is projected to be effective, can be a necessary mechanism to 
promote human rights. If a government is oppressing its people, and is unresponsive to other 
methods of sanction, then the international community may determine it vital to protect the 
people by actually entering the state. In certain cases, this could take the form of state 
governments or NGOs providing food or other basic resources to subjugated persons, or could 
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require some form of military action. The latter is obviously much more controversial, bringing 
about questions of just war, intervention and ulterior motivations on the part of invading states.88  
Yet, many times, the most important concern is not the means by which states seek to 
provide assistance, but when assistance is truly necessary. The circumstances under which the 
international community decides when to act will most certainly be situational; issues of 
resources, cultures, and politics create additional concerns for both the assisting and assisted 
states. Despite the variety of potential options, assisting or intervening states must determine 
whether or not they could reasonably succeed in intervention, whether the cost of action would 
be too great, or whether it would significantly disable their military or international political 
force.89 For example, after several decades of heavy humanitarian and military intervention, the 
United States Federal Government, while maintaining willingness to conduct humanitarian 
intervention in extreme cases, decided in 2012 that it would no longer commit troops to 
protracted stability engagements.90 It is easy to surmise that such a decision was made based on 
the public’s reaction toward recent American involvement in the Middle East and cuts to the 
United States’ defense budget.91 
Furthermore, the general practice of guaranteeing a right to self-determination makes any 
sort of direct intervention problematic. While the international community might desire to amend 
human rights ills that occur within another state, the citizens of that state may seek to correct 
such problems without external interference. The possibility also exists that international actors 
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could significantly disrupt the government and create superfluous harms that would not 
otherwise affect the population. As James Traub concedes in his New York Times op-ed “The 
End of American Intervention”, “[T]hose of us who have championed an idealistic foreign policy 
[…] have been forced to recognize both how much harm the United States can do with the best 
of intentions and how very hard it is to shape good outcomes inside other countries. So we must 
accept, if uneasily, the future which now seems to lie before us: We will do less good in the 
world, but also less harm.”92  
 What question remains, however, is why a two-level system would be acceptable. Why 
can this model escape from the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism and Pogge’s institutionalism, which 
seem to demand either everything or nothing of the international community? It succeeds 
because Beitz recognizes the political realities associated with human rights and states. Yes, 
international standards of human treatment create obligations on the part of states. The 
international community is obligated to provide secondary support to states that do not promote 
the human rights of their inhabitants. However, each of these states has primary responsibilities 
and is first accountable to their own citizens. As Pogge so clearly describes in his work, state 
governments serve the desires and goals of their people.93 They have to first meet the essential 
conditions and standards of treatment for their own populations before attempting to help 
others.94 And even when states have the ability to meet those standards, they still have to 
determine the overall utility of acting. States are forced to weigh the benefits of intervening or 
assisting in scenarios of rights abuse; to claim otherwise would be to misconstrue the way !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Traub, James, “The End of American Intervention,” The New York Times, February 18, 2012, accessed March 8, 
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93 Pogge, “How Should Human Rights,” 198. 
94 It seems rational to say that nations who do not have proper resources or capacity would not be responsible to 
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nations conceive of responsibilities.95 The two-level system recognizes the unique character of 
the international community, and the way that it ought to act as a safety net for primary actors 
that are unwilling or unable to ensure human rights in their own territory. The system does not 
create an infinite demand on external actors, but creates mandatory standards of treatment that 
they must help to guarantee.  
To that end, the international community has created a series of institutions that are 
capable of providing assistance to disrespected citizens and seek to prevent the proliferation of 
human rights abuse. Situations exist in which direct intervention on the part of a powerful state 
would be both inappropriate and impractical. There will be times when states ought to rely 
instead on the institutions that have been created to serve these ends, rather than seeking out 
unilateral action.96 Thus, while the global society must provide assistance to disrespected 
peoples, the means by which it does so and the division of labor between actors remains 
unsettled and can be determined based on individual circumstances.  
 The Beitz model conceptualizes human rights for what they are to the international 
community: standards of treatment meant to promote human dignity. The model respects these 
rights for the value that they clearly hold, but does not seek to attribute any more extensive moral 
or philosophical value to them. It acknowledges that the creation of these rights similarly creates 
obligations for both states and the international community. Rights exist as guarantees of 
minimum conditions for life and liberty, and citizens can claim these guarantees from their states 
if standards are not met. If states, the primary actors in the two-level system, cannot or will not 
protect the rights of their citizens, the obligation falls to the international community. The 
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collection of states and institutions that can reasonably provide assistance are obliged to do so, 
although third-party actors can manage these obligations in a variety of ways. Beitz recognizes 
that states cannot realistically intervene or assist in every circumstance; they have primary 
responsibilities to their own citizens, and there are many international institutions are designed to 
promote human rights internationally. The development of human rights has created demands on 
national governments that extend beyond their physical borders, and governments must consider 
these obligations in conjunction with their other mandates. There may be situations, including 
genocide, wars of aggression or other violations of human rights that will require direct 
intervention or assistance on the part of states across the globe, but there are many times when 
issues of human rights will be addressed by the international organizations that have emerged 
from and are funded by those states. The second part of this paper considers one of these 
institutions: the International Criminal Court. 
 
Chapter Two: The International Criminal Court 
 The International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) was created by the Rome Statute in 
1998, and ratified by the mandatory 60 state parties in 2002. It represented an attempt to hold the 
perpetrators of atrocites accountable for their crimes, and to seek justice for these abuses 
internationally. Indeed, the Court would seem to be the criminal counterpart to the International 
Court of Justice; a body that could hold leaders accountable for their criminal acts in the same 
way that the ICJ holds them to their civil agreements. The ICC emerged from similar 
circumstances to the UDHR, as it seeks to maintain the standards that are put forth in 
international human rights law. Yet, as a body that has the ability to take action against a wide 
variety of individual actors in an unlimited number of situations, it took significantly longer to 
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create a court that was generally acceptable to the international community. Creating an 
institution that would to somewhat supersede national authority caused tremendous hesitation 
amongst state leaders, and as a result, the Court took a large amount of time to develop fully.  
 While it did take over fifty years to put this court in place, the eventual institution was 
powerful and significant. The Court has power to prosecute “genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the crime of aggression” in circumstances when a crime was committed in a state 
that is party to the statute, when the perpetrator is a citizen of a member state, or when a 
“situation” is referred by the Security Council (“UNSC” or “Council”).97 With this expansive 
jurisdiction, the international community guaranteed that the worst crimes could be prosecuted in 
most circumstances. While some states, most notably the United States, Russia, and China, have 
taken significant steps to try and protect themselves from the jurisdiction of the Court, over 120 
countries across the globe have submitted to the authority of the ICC since 1998.98 
 Proponents of the ICC were overjoyed when it eventually came to fruition in 2002. They 
claimed that the Court would end impunity for the criminals behind the worst crimes on the 
planet, would make an important statement about justice internationally, would increase impetus 
for states to prosecute their own nationals for crimes, and lastly, would eventually prevent such 
atrocities in the future. The final implication is both the most speculative and also the most 
important. The framers of the Rome Statute were “determined to put an end to impunity for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 UN document A/CONF.183/9, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” July 17, 1998, Art. 6, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. 
98 The Bush Administration took a variety of actions to attempt to protect Americans overseas from the power of the 
Court. Not only did it “unsign” the Rome Statute, which Clinton had approved at the end of his presidency, it also 
passed the American Service Members Protection Act, and an array of individual treaties with states that would 
functionally guarantee that Americans would not be prosecuted by the Court in any instance. The Obama 
administration has softened on this stance, working with the Court in certain situations, but has stilled maintained 
the decision to avoid becoming party to the Rome Statute.  
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perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.99 The 
framers truly believed that, long term, the Court would change the calculus associated with 
crimes against humanity; these crimes would no longer be a viable tool for leaders because they 
would understand their personal liability for their actions. Leaders could no longer hide behind 
diplomatic immunity, as they would be accountable for the worst crimes to the international 
community as a whole. 
 One other strength of the Court was its ability to distribute justice effectively and 
impartially. Previous trials, like the Nuremburg trials or the ICTR, only prosecuted one side for 
the crimes that they committed during wartime. As a permanent and impartial observer, the ICC 
could prevent unequal prosecutions, and could instead treat the victorious and the defeated 
parties equally. Proponents argued that this court could truly serve justice, and could eventually 
decrease the extreme abuses of rights that have and continue to occur across the globe. 
 Alas, over ten years later, it is difficult to determine whether the international community 
has succeeded in its efforts to build such an impactful institution, or if the Court is similar to 
other documents of human rights: a statement of what ought to be true, without any real means of 
making it so. This chapter will take on that question, and will evaluate the Court as a means to 
protect rights and to uphold the international community’s obligations to citizens across the 
world.  
To clarify, this paper recognizes the theoretical power of the Court, as well as its practical 
and theoretical limitations. It in no way contends that the Court could or should be held to the 
standard of protecting all human rights or even to potentially hold all perpetrators accountable 
for their crimes. Rather, it wishes to evaluate the ICC for what it is: one institution that, as part of 
a larger effort on the part of international actors, could encourage and help mandate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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43 
 
accountability to norms of human rights across the globe. It would be disingenuous to demand 
more of the Court than is possible, but it would also be unreasonable to say that the ICC is a 
good institution without substantial analysis.  
 This chapter will begin by describing the history of the International Criminal Court, 
detailing both the political basis for the Court and the other institutions that served as a model. 
Then, it will explain the most important and controversial aspects of the Rome Statute, and the 
ways in which these provisions were contested during the 1998 Rome Conference. This 
discussion will provide a general picture of the Court’s most important powers and duties, and 
will provide insight into how these duties fit within Beitz’s two-level system. Afterward, it will 
provide a descriptive account of the trials of Joseph Kony of Uganda and Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These are the most important cases that have faced the 
Court in its ten-year lifespan, and provide a number of examples of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Court in practice. The final part of the chapter will consider the future prospects of the 
Court and a general evaluation of the Court as a mechanism to promote international justice. 
 
Section One: The History of the Court 
 To begin, this section will consider the ICC as a historical reality. It will discuss the 
means by which an international tribunal to prosecute criminal acts came about, the goals of such 
an institution and actions that the Court has taken since its inception in 2002. Furthermore, it will 
consider the ways in which the various powers and duties of the ICC relate to the Beitz model 
explained in Chapter One. 
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Part A: The Prerequisites 
 The International Criminal Court finds its roots well before the creation of the Rome 
Statute in 1998. The true roots of the Court date back over a century, as states across the world 
sought to impose standards regarding the treatment of civilians during war. These “Hague 
Conventions”, signed in 1899 and 1907, represent historical benchmarks in the prosecution of 
war crimes, as they brought about some guarantees of respect for non-combatants.100 There were 
attempts to prosecute German leaders and soldiers for such crimes in the years following World 
War I, but these efforts largely failed. The international community was divided on the issue of 
prosecuting Kaiser Wilhelm, given that any charges would seem to represent ex post facto legal 
standards.101 Wilhelm was eventually granted asylum in the Netherlands, where the Allies were 
unable to try him. They did succeed, however, in trying some German military personnel, but 
these tribunals were held in little esteem and resulted in few substantial punishments.102 
 These early attempts set the stage for the Nuremburg trials following World War II, 
which many point to as the basis of the demand for the International Criminal Court. In 1945, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France sought to hold the Germans accountable for the crimes 
that they had committed in Europe throughout the war. William Schabas recounts, “In October 
1945, indictments were served on twenty-four Nazi leaders. Their trial – known as the Trial of 
the Major War Criminals – began the following month. It concluded nearly a year later, with the 
conviction of nineteen defendants and the imposition of sentence of death in twelve cases. The 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction was confined to three categories of offence: crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.”103 This tribunal had significant international backing and a 
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more substantial legal standing than those before it, and thus was able to successfully convict 
many of the German perpetrators.104  
 In the years following World War II, there were a number of major developments that 
would aid the creation of the ICC. The driving force behind these developments was the United 
Nations, which was formally created in San Francisco in June 1945.105 Member states of this 
new organization made it a priority to create mandates that would prevent atrocities like those 
the Nazis had perpetrated on much of Europe. The General Assembly made outlawing the crime 
of genocide a priority in its nascent years, passing the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide in 1948.106 While fifty years passed before the creation of the Rome 
Statute, this resolution remains the primary legal basis for the International Criminal Court. In 
order to give this convention real power, the member nations of the U.N. ordered the newly 
founded International Law Commission (“ILC”) to create a body of law meant to protect persons 
from crimes against humanity and war crimes, and also to set up a court that could prosecute 
these crimes internationally.107  
 Political tensions between the major powers and difficultly defining applicable crimes 
made it impossible for the Court to come about in the middle of the 20th century. While the 
relevant committees proposed interpretations of both the legal code and the makeup of the 
international court, the U.N. could not envision a means to adequately define “aggression” as a 
crime, particularly in the political atmosphere associated with the Cold War.108  It took over 
twenty years to overcome objections to any specific interpretation of the crime, and by that time 
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efforts toward such institutions had stalled. Trinidad and Tobago brought the matter before the 
General Assembly again in 1989, but it was not until the international tribunals in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 that the creation of an international court became a priority once 
again.109 These ad hoc tribunals solved many of the perceived weaknesses of a court, and their 
overall success reinvigorated advocacy for an ICC. As Schabas notes, “[T]he Tribunals did more 
than simply set legal precedent to guide the drafters. They also provided a reassuring model of 
what an international criminal court might look like.”110 The International Law Commission 
received approval for the mechanism of a court in 1994 and for the laws it would protect two 
years later in 1996.111 The proposals of the ILC would represent the legal basis of the Rome 
Statute and the International Criminal Court. 
 It is easy to see that the creation of the ICC as a means to hold offenders accountable for 
the worst crimes emerged as a necessary institution for the promotion of human rights on a 
global scale. Like international human rights, the ICC traces its roots primarily to the global 
community’s response to the inhumane practices of Nazi Germany and the universal desire for 
such acts to never again occur. Yet, before the creation of the Court, there was no mechanism to 
hold leaders accountable for violations of human rights outside domestic legal systems. 
International standards demanded an international method of prosecution.  
As an institution of force, however, as opposed to a list of standards, it was significantly 
more difficult to get the political support necessary for an international court. While all 
governments might have been able to agree that the world needed an international criminal 
tribunal, powerful nations were unlikely to cede significant authority to external institutions, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Arsanjani, Mahnoush H. “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal of 
International Law 93, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2997954. 
110!Schabas, Introduction to the ICC, location 503.!
111 Ibid, location 449. 
47 
 
the Court required states willing submit to its jurisdiction. Many facets of the ICC brought about 
debate during in the creation and signing of the Rome Statute, as the signatories sought to strike 
a balance between protecting their people and guaranteeing accountability for violations of 
rights. 
 
Part B: The Rome Statute and the Facets of the Court 
 While the work of the International Law Commission was certainly the theoretical basis 
of the burgeoning International Criminal Court, the Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“Rome Conference” 
or “Conference”) had many decisions to make on the final form of the ICC. The Preparatory 
Committee, the group of representatives of nations and international institutions that would put 
forth the proposal for the Rome Statute, met beginning in 1996 up until the Rome Conference in 
1998.112 Despite the years of work put into the statute before 1998, the document remained 
“riddled with some fourteen hundred square brackets, i.e. points of disagreement, surrounding 
partial and complete provisions”, according to Committee of the Whole Chairman Philippe 
Kirsh.113 To make the process of crafting the Court as efficient as possible, representatives were 
divided into smaller groups that would seek to finalize various parts of the document. Kirsh’s 
committee would attempt to bridge the gaps on the most important issues related to the statute.114 
In order to best address the differing opinions on the Court, this paper will list the contentious 
arguments that faced the representatives at the Conference, many of which comprise the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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113 Kirsh Phillipe and John T. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating 
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important and controversial issues for the ICC today. When applicable, I will elucidate on which 
parties supported or fought against a certain provision, their reasons for doing so, and the 
relevance of these proposals to the two-level model. 
 The first provision worth noting is one that was decided prior to the Rome Conference, 
but remains an essential aspect of the International Criminal Court: the principle of 
complementarity.115 This principle relates heavily to the independence of the Court, and 
represents governing idea behind the ICC; it is limited to act as a secondary institution rather 
than a primary means of prosecution. The notion of complementarity is enshrined in Article I to 
the final Rome Statute, which reads, “[The Court] shall be a permanent institution and shall have 
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”116 This aspect of the ICC is explained more thoroughly in Article 17, “Issues of 
Admissibility”. It clarifies:  
[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case 
has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.117 
Thus, the ICC is only able to take on a case if states have neglected to prosecute individuals who 
are responsible for crimes against humanity or are unable to do so within their domestic legal 
systems. As a result, the Court serves as a well-constructed safety net for the prosecution of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Schabas, Introduction to the ICC, location 570. 
116 UN document, “Rome Statute,” Art. I. 
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crimes: it respects the national sovereignty of states by allowing them primary jurisdiction, but 
can ensure that cases are investigated if states fail to act. States would, however, be encouraged 
to prosecute crimes on their own territory in most cases, as their people are most affected, and 
the burden ought not fall completely to the international community. Jo Stigen describes the 
potential interaction between the state and international levels when he writes, “[E]xercising 
criminal jurisdiction over the crimes in question is ‘the duty of every State’. Enhancing national 
proceedings is necessary due to the fact that the ICC, a single court with only 18 judges, will 
have a very limited capacity […] Besides, the Rome Statute appears to build on the assumption 
that prosecuting the crimes nationally is also preferable”.118 If the International Criminal Court is 
to work as efficiently as possible, nations must prioritize seeking justice through domestic courts, 
and the Court will be required to act in only extreme circumstances. 
 Unlike most of the issues associated with the Court, the notion of complementarity was 
largely decided before the Rome Conference. That is not to say that the complimentary principle 
was any less controversial; rather, it was an issue that had to be agreed upon if there were any 
hope for the Court to be created. The debate on the jurisdiction of the ICC took many forms 
during the ILC conferences and the Preparatory Committee meetings between 1990 and 1998. 
The debate focused mainly on how far the international community would allow the Court to 
encroach upon national sovereignty in hopes of respecting human dignity. Some representatives 
saw the ICC as only a court of appeals: one that could act if any of the parties involved found the 
results of the state’s trial to be unjustified. Others found that the Court should not be able to 
prosecute cases that had been undertaken domestically in any circumstance.119 These proposals 
would have shielded nations from a court with a political agenda or significant imposition into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Stigen, Jo, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle 
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their own government affairs, but would be unlikely to have real power with regard to human 
rights. States could stage trials to protect their nationals and prevent the ICC from ever being 
able to prosecute, which would do little to provide a safety net of international accountability.120  
 Over time, it became clear that the Court would serve exclusively as a secondary option, 
acting when states were “unwilling or unable” to “genuinely” prosecute crimes that they had 
jurisdiction over.121 Yet, in circumstances where the Court’s ability to prosecute is debated, the 
power remains with the Court, rather than with the domestic tribunals. Such a decision seems 
rational, as otherwise the Court would remain ineffective against a state that wished to defend its 
citizens from prosecution. Sovereignty remains respected in states that do not wish to participate, 
as they are forced to accede to the Court before the ICC could prosecute crimes that were 
directed at their citizens or occurred on their own territory.122 The principle of complementarity 
seems to strike a fair balance between respect for the states and for the protection of human 
dignity internationally. It gives states the primary responsibilities associated with prosecuting 
crimes against humanity, but ensures that justice can still be served if those actors fail to do so.  
 The second contentious argument during the Rome Conference was the scope and 
definition of crimes that the ICC would take on. The ICC limits its jurisdiction to genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.123 The limited nature of these 
crimes can be partially attributed to concerns of resources, but serves primarily to restrict the 
goals of the Court to the worst of crimes. The first three crimes were those put forth in the ILC’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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conception of law, and all four can reasonably be viewed as universally undesirable.124 Many 
less-powerful states sought international jurisdiction over terrorism and drug trafficking, but 
those crimes were never seriously considered.125 Terrorism in particular would seem difficult to 
prosecute, as claims of “terrorism” are usually limited to the victim.126  
By seeking jurisdiction only in the most extreme cases, the ICC attempted to appeal to 
the vast majority of governments. Nations would likely be wary of a court that could prosecute 
any number of mundane crimes; it would expose their citizens to international punishment in a 
wide array of circumstances. In choosing crimes that are unequivocally reviled, those that the 
internationally community has a true stake in protecting in a post-Nazi Germany era, the statute 
would seem to appease any doubts of a politicized court. All of these crimes seem to find their 
basis in internationally customary law, and thus a Court serving justice to these criminals would 
seem to be amenable to all governments. Alas, that has not been the case.127 
A similar debate was had over the types of weapons that would be included in the 
description of “war crimes”. Some states wanted the list of the use of nuclear weapons to be 
expressly forbidden, but the United States and other nations that already had nuclear capability 
were strongly opposed. The smaller nations lamented the fact that biological weapons, 
considered “the nuclear weapons of the poor”, were included, but given the lack of any sort of 
international ban on nuclear arms, it was difficult to claim their use as a criminal act.128 
Additionally, representatives were not willing to risk angering the major world powers, as all 
nations were concerned that losing their support could prevent the Court from ever coming to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fruition. The conference also included an amendment process for this list of crimes, which would 
provide the international community the option of banning new weapons or even nuclear 
weapons in the future.129 Overall, the ICC limited the scope of its weapons in order to focus 
heavily on the crimes within its jurisdiction and to be most effective in prosecuting the worst 
offenders.  
The third major debate that went on at the Rome Conference centered around the role of 
the U.N. Security Council with regard to the Court. The Security Council, and specifically the 
United States, wanted the Court to exist as a body that would be subservient to the Council’s 
will.130 The vast majority of states did not want the UNSC to have significant authority over the 
Court, as they believed that it could create more arbitrary accountability. Kirsh and Holmes 
recount, “Without opposing a role for the Security Council vis-a-vis the court, for example, 
many states believed that the Council could not be relied upon to administer justice in an 
impartial manner, and that care should be taken not to let the court's independence be 
undermined.”131 The Council wanted the Rome Statute to guarantee it a significant role in 
determining which cases should be prosecuted. However, the vast majority of states fought 
against the authority of the Security Council, and its eventual role was modest. 
The Security Council sought authority in several capacities. First, the Council wanted to 
limit the ways a case could be referred to the Court. The UNSC wanted the power to refer cases 
to the Court through resolutions, and wanted to limit the authority of the Court to take up cases 
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on its own.132 The participating states did not constrain the freedom of the Court, which will be 
addressed below, but did provide the Council with the ability to refer cases.133 Security Council 
referrals also carry additional weight with the Court, as these cases are not restricted by on the 
nationality of the victim or the perpetrator.  
However, the Security Council also wanted the power to veto cases that they believed 
could interfere with political goals or initiatives of the Council. At one point, the Council sought 
to ban any prosecutions that involved a “situation under consideration by the Council.”134 Over 
time, these demands softened, but there remained representatives at the Conference who wanted 
to remove the Council’s role entirely.135 Nevertheless, the majority of delegates recognized both 
the importance of the Security Council and, once again, the potential that these significant states 
would abandon the Court. The final Rome Statute gave the Council the ability to “defer” cases 
that they felt would jeopardize political occurrences of interest to the UN and to the Council. 
This deferral could be renewed annually by a resolution of the UNSC at its discretion.136 While 
this was initially a source of significant concern for proponents of a truly independent Court, in 
practice this provision has been used sparingly. In 2003, the Security Council deferred the case 
of Liberian President Charles Taylor, largely due to political considerations.137 While this action 
created some panic with regard to the relationship between the Council and the Court, the 
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deferral was not renewed in 2004, and the veto power of the five permanent members makes it 
unlikely for such provisions to be used in an improper manner.138 
The final contentious provision in the Rome Statute is the role of the prosecutor. The 
strong belief was that the prosecutor needed significant independence, so that he or she would be 
able to undertake investigations on crimes that had not been referred by either the state or the 
Security Council. This ability of the prosecutor to undertake cases proprio motu was certainly 
contentious, as it brought about the possibility of a rogue prosecutor or politicized charges.139 In 
addition, she could review cases when they were taken up by the states themselves in order to 
ensure that the trials were completed genuinely. This provided the prosecutor with substantial 
power, and thus the members of the conference realized that it was necessary to check her 
authority, so as to prevent abuse. Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the prosecutor must 
receive authorization of the pretrial chamber to conduct any investigation proprio motu.140 This 
prevents the prosecutor from charging any leader on her own, and creates a significant barrier to 
politicized prosecutions.141 While these provisions were certainly controversial, it is clear that the 
issue of prosecutorial authority had largely been determined before the Rome Conference: there 
were many other issues that demanded the attention of the representatives.142 Nevertheless, the 
power of the prosecutor remains an incredibly noteworthy provision, given her authority to take 
up cases against any abuses of human rights she deems necessary. This was an important facet of 
the Court, given the limited other means of referral. 
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The independent prosecutor is a necessary aspect of a Court that seeks to serve as a safety 
net for human rights, and one that seeks to guarantee respect for human dignity regardless of 
political pressures. With respect to the Court’s role in the two-level system, the prosecutor seems 
to fit perfectly. She, like the Court, is a secondary agent that can seek out the promotion of rights 
on her own, with or without the support of any particular state.143 This fact is incredibly 
important, especially when considering the political power of a state like the U.S. Without the 
powers of an independent prosecutor, the United States government could commit atrocities in 
U.S. territory or in a country that is not party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC would be unable 
to prosecute American leaders. The U.S. veto in the Security Council would prevent a referral 
from that body as well, which would leave the Court powerless.144 The independent prosecutor 
solves this issue, and is an important factor in providing accountability evenly for all perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity. 
These four provisions not only represent some of the heavily contentious issues at the 
Rome Conference in 1998, but also serve as the most important aspects of the International 
Criminal Court as a whole. The representatives at the Rome Conference needed a Court that 
would be acceptable to the majority of nations, and thus were forced to compromise in many 
cases, but were still able to achieve an independent Court with jurisdiction over the most 
reprehensible crimes. The complementarity principle protects the sovereignty of states in most 
cases, but the power of the independent prosecutor and referrals from the Security Council 
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guarantee that the ICC will be able to prosecute in circumstances where states cannot or will not 
hold citizens liable for crimes.  
The Rome Statute passed the point of sixty ratifications on April 11, 2002. Proponents of 
the Court praised its ability to hold individual perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity accountable for their actions. Indeed, this was thought to be a permanent alternative to 
the tribunals of the 1990s, and a body that would be able to serve justice consistently. Pundits 
could see the powerful facets of the Court and make claims about its tremendous theoretical 
impact in deterring these atrocities crimes. However, in the ten years following the Rome 
Statute’s entry into force, the Court has not been the institution that analysts praised. It is 
necessary to consider the entirety of its actions since 2002 in order to expose these struggles. 
   
Part C: The First Cases of the Court 
Since the ratification of the Court in 2002, the ICC has taken on a tremendous amount, 
but has simultaneously failed to have any real impact on most of the cases that it has 
investigated. In the ten years of its operation, the Court has taken on eight different “situations”, 
as they are referred to in the Rome Statute, and is in the early process of investigating several 
others throughout the world.145 In 2012, following a three-year trial, the Court finally put forth its 
first verdict and sentence, declaring Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubango Dyilo guilty of 
using child soldiers and condemning him to 14 years in prison at the Hague.146 Such a 
prosecution was an immense step for the still young institution, but only a small victory in a 
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much larger war against injustice and impunity. Questions also remain about the rest of the 
ICC’s actions in the past ten years, and it is necessary to evaluate these instances as well in order 
to uncover the true nature of the Court. This section will provide a brief history of the acts and 
cases of the Court to this point, and then will use these cases to provide examples of the more 
general struggles of the ICC and its prosecution team.  
As is stated clearly in the preamble of the Rome Statute, the ICC seeks not only to hold 
perpetrators of the worst crimes accountable, but also to deter future leaders from ordering 
similar atrocities.147 In hopes of achieving this end, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo began 
investigating situations that he believed were important to international justice on the whole. 
While many believed that Moreno-Ocampo would be forced to begin investigations using his 
proprio mortu authority, there were almost 500 referrals for cases across the world in early 
2003.148 Most of these cases fell outside of the Court’s jurisdiction either temporally or based 
upon the type of crimes, but significant debate remained regarding which cases he would take 
up. He looked first to two state referrals, those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Uganda. As Schabas describes in his history of the Court, both situations represented cases when 
the states in question had difficulty with rebel groups within their own territory, and wanted the 
ICC to assist in solving its struggles.149 
The case in Uganda primarily regarded the crimes of Joseph Kony of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (“LRA”), which had taken up residence in the northern region of the country, 
and had unleashed significant attacks both against the Ugandan army and general population of 
the country. The LRA emerged as a militia in response to the NRA, the forces that put Yoweri 
Museveni in power as the President of Uganda. While initially unimportant and fairly peaceful, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the LRA became increasingly violent in 1988 after merging with some former leaders of the 
Uganda People’s Democratic Army, who had settled with Museveni’s government.150 Over the 
next 15 years, Kony perpetrated constant terror on Northern Uganda. The LRA abducted over 
28,000 children, forcing them to kill and commit other atrocities against their own people. LRA 
forces routinely attacked and killed both government forces and the supporters of the NRA in 
Northern Uganda and South Sudan. The government of Uganda referred the case to the ICC in 
2002, and the investigation of the prosecutor began soon afterward.  
After several years of preliminary investigation, Moreno-Ocampo sought warrants for the 
arrest of five LRA leaders, including Kony, in the summer of 2005. The decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to grant these warrants was certainly a momentous event for the young Court, and but 
one that has remained debated in the years following.151 While few doubt Kony or the other 
leaders’ involvement in atrocities, the ICC warrants proved to be more of an impediment to the 
end of their impunity than anything else. While the arrest warrants brought Kony and the other 
commanders to the bargaining table, the threat of eventual prosecution prevented the LRA 
leadership from ever actually accepting a peace agreement. The Ugandan government had 
already offered amnesty to most LRA soldiers willing to end violence, but the ICC warrants for 
the leaders remained. Kony and his lieutenants were unwilling to accept an agreement that would 
leave them open to prosecution. This caused several Ugandan leaders to urge Moreno-Ocampo to 
revoke the warrants, but the prosecutor maintained his stance. Talks with Kony eventually broke 
off, and while he no longer causes terror in Northern Uganda, he remains at large to this day, 
despite international efforts to apprehend him. 
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The second case is that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a warlord from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Lubanga and his followers were accused of committing between 5,000 
and 8,000 murders in the Ituri region of the Congo, but the warrant issued in February 2006 
focused on a specific aspect of Lubanga’s regime. Schabas describes:  
The Lubanga arrest warrant concerned the recruitment of child soldiers. It noted that 
between July 2002 and December 2003 members of the Forces patriotiques pour la 
libération du Congo, of which Lubanga was the leader, had repeatedly enlisted children 
under fifteen years of age, who were brought to various training camps. The arrest 
warrant said there were also reasonable grounds to believe that, during the same period, 
children under fifteen participated actively in hostilities.152 
The use of child soldiers was the most objectionable aspect of Lubanga’s regime, and the one 
that brought about the eventual ICC warrant. Lubanga had already been captured beforehand in 
2005, and was transported to the Hague in 2006.153 After evidentiary issues delayed the trial for 
several years, it eventually began in 2009. It concluded in early 2012, with a conviction of 
Lubanga for the use of child soldiers and a sentence of 14 years.154 Both Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
and Moreno-Ocampo appealed the decision in October of 2012, and the case remains uncertain 
at the time of this writing.  
 Several other cases are currently under investigation, but these two have required the 
most involvement from the ICC, and thus provide the best means to evaluate the Court. The next 
section will consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Court that have been exposed in these 
early years. 
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Section Two: The Evaluation of the Court 
 The Court was able to successfully prosecute one case in the first decade of its operation, 
and has investigated and sought warrants for additional situations within its jurisdiction. It may 
have fallen short of its lofty expectations following the Rome Conference, but has at least 
become an acceptable institution, capable of carrying out the basic requirements set out before it. 
Nevertheless, the early actions of the Court provide us with an idea of what form the Court will 
actually take, rather than the ways it could act. These nascent years have shown us that the Court 
is riddled with both expected and unexpected struggles, but also that it does have the ability to 
prosecute the worst offenders and contribute to the maintenance of justice across the world. 
 Unfortunately, the Lubanga and the Kony cases, in conjunction with the failures to 
apprehend or prosecute many other perpetrators it has sought out, have revealed the actual 
limitations of this idyllic Court. The authority of the prosecutor, the ability to impose justice both 
effectively and impartially, and the difficult dichotomy between accountability and peace have 
all been exposed as concerns about the Court in its first decade. Some of these problems could 
feasibly be solved as the ICC develops, but some seem to indicate more extensive issues with the 
makeup of the Court. 
 To begin, Luis Moreno-Ocampo had significant difficulties in his term as head 
prosecutor. Moreno-Ocampo was an incredibly strong candidate for the position when elected to 
the role in 2002, but eventually struggled to fulfill the role, most notably in the Lubanga trial.155  
 However, it is first necessary to discuss the cases Moreno-Ocampo took up and the way 
in which he conducted his investigations. Perhaps the most common critique of the current 
International Criminal Court is the choice of situations that it has attempted to prosecute. The 
eight situations on which the ICC has focused investigations all occur in Africa, which has led !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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some observers to believe that the Court is targeting the continent exclusively.156 President Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda stated openly that the ICC was “put in place only for African countries, only 
for poor countries” and refused to submit on the basis of the “colonialism, slavery, and 
imperialism” he associated with the Court.157 While it is easy to see why critics of the Court 
would seek to expose this behavior, the fact that each of these investigations is targeted at an 
African leader does not make the cases themselves biased. Abdul Tejan-Cole, a former 
prosecutor from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, wrote in 2012, “They might all be African 
but they are also all legitimate. It is farcical that we can equate the trial of 25 accused with the 
trial of an entire continent.”158 The trial of several certain African leaders, each bearing 
legitimate responsibility for crimes against humanity, does not mean that Court is exclusively 
seeking to prosecute the leaders of African nations or of poor nations.159 Prosecutor Bensouda, 
herself from Gambia, reiterated this argument in a September 2012 interview, explaining that she 
seeks accountability for the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and will prosecute wherever 
necessary to do so.160   
To say nothing of the choice of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo as the first defendant before the 
Court, Moreno-Ocampo made numerous mistakes in his trial that prevented an efficient and 
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effectual prosecution.161 As noted previously, Lubanga’s trial, which began in 2007, was delayed 
twice by evidentiary issues. In summer 2008, Moreno-Ocampo failed to bring forth potentially 
exculpatory information, and the trial was put on hold. The issue was resolved several months 
later, and the trial finally began in early 2009.162 In July 2010, the judges once again stayed the 
trial after Moreno-Ocampo was unwilling to adhere to the Court’s wishes and expose the identity 
of one of his witness intermediaries, which was requested because the Court was skeptical of 
testimonies associated with the individual.163 The case proceeded after the Appeals Chamber of 
the Court overturned the previous decision in October 2010.164 A guilty verdict was eventually 
given in March 2012.  
 It is easy to see that the mistakes of the Prosecutor significantly delayed the trial. The 
decisions of Moreno-Ocampo in both cases made it significantly more difficult to achieve the 
conviction, and actually raised the possibility of Lubanga being released entirely. The failures of 
Moreno-Ocampo to bring forth necessary evidence prevented an efficient and effective trial. 
Complications with witnesses and evidence delayed the Court from proceeding multiple times, 
and extended a case that could have been completed much sooner. Yes, he was eventually 
convicted, but it took seven years from the time the arrest warrants were released. As Lubanga 
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has already appealed the decision, and the prosecution has appealed the 14-year sentence, it is 
difficult to say when this trial will officially end.165 
 Following the immense difficulty that the prosecution encountered with regard to 
achieving the conviction, the eventual sentence would seem to be something of a 
disappointment. Lubanga’s 14-year sentence, which will include his time already served, appears 
weak in relation to the crimes many claim he committed. If Moreno-Ocampo had decided to 
charge the Congolese leader with sexual violence in addition to the use of child soldiers, the 
sentence could have been more significant.166 Yet, despite implicating Lubanga’s army in such 
actions multiple times, and hearing multiple accounts of sexual violence from victims, the 
prosecution chose not to seek a conviction on those grounds.167  
Nevertheless, many claim that a conviction and a 14-year sentence is a victory for 
international justice, and for any and all children who are forced to become soldiers across the 
world.168 Tiina Intelmann of Estonia, the President of the Assembly of State Parties, stated 
proudly, “this verdict, which completes the trial phase of the first-ever case before the 
International Criminal Court, demonstrates that the ICC works: the system set up by the Rome 
Statute to bring an end to impunity for the worst crimes under international law is an operational 
reality. We have left the age of impunity behind us and entered the age of accountability.”169 
Even the U.S. government, gradually easing its stance with the Court, praised the end of 
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impunity for criminals endangering children in this way.170 Indeed, it would be nearly impossible 
to argue that this case was not at very least momentous: a permanent international tribunal 
successfully prosecuted a leader guilty of crimes against humanity. Accountability is the first 
necessary step in any effort towards deterrence, and the potential end of such crimes being 
committed anywhere.  
 While I will not seek to argue with the conclusion of this case as a victory, it is necessary 
to temper bold claims about the power of the Court and question the overall efficacy of 
Lubanga’s trial. After many years of terror in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and seven 
years of trial, the Court was only able to convict Lubanga on the use of child soldiers. He will 
serve less than a decade more in prison, and then will be released back into the world. It is 
difficult to say that this represents justice for the crimes he orchestrated. J. Peter Pham, in an op-
ed piece for The New York Times, makes a similar argument with regard to the conviction of 
Charles Taylor in a separate court created to handle his crimes in Sierra Leone.171 Pham details 
that despite the atrocities committed across Liberia by Taylor and his military forces, the tribunal 
was only able to convict him on limited counts of “aiding and abetting” certain crimes. Although 
Taylor was given 50 years in prison, an effective life sentence, his argument resonates well with 
regard to Lubanga.172 Is this the most effective way to prevent future crimes against humanity? 
And are we really serving justice if we are unable to convict the leaders efficiently for the 
atrocities that they have committed? As Pham concludes, “[I]t will be worth celebrating only if it 
prompts the international community to develop a system that delivers justice to victims more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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quickly and punishes all war criminals, not just the most notorious ones.”173 The failure of this 
trial and of recent international tribunals to account for the entirety of the perpetrators’ crimes is 
a problem that extends beyond any failures of the Prosecutor, and one that implicates the ICC 
and all international courts.174 
  A further critique of the Court’s effectiveness notes the inability of the ICC to apprehend 
the perpetrators it seeks to indict. Currently, nine of the total nineteen suspects with warrants put 
forth by the ICC remain at large.175 This is primarily a function of the prosecutor’s complete 
dependence on the force of member states or other amenable governments to assist in 
investigations or to arrest criminals. The Rome Statute dictates, “A State Party which has 
received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps 
to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws”.176 This provision demands the 
expenditure of both labor and financial resources within a state, which necessarily brings about 
political considerations for the leaders of such a state.177 As a result, the enforcement mechanism 
of the Court is somewhat suspect, and the Court is potentially unable to act with true 
independence.178 
 Moreno-Ocampo’s term as prosecutor was riddled with such problems. In his efforts to 
bring Kony and Lubanga to justice, he completely ignored the abuses of the governments that 
referred the case to the ICC. Phil Clark of the University of London detailed of the relationship 
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between these leaders and the Court when he wrote, “Museveni and Kabila have proven 
masterful at making themselves indispensable to international actors. Unquestioning 
international cooperation with the Ugandan and Congolese governments has allowed them to 
appear as agents of peace, security and justice while continuing to commit abuses against their 
citizens.”179 The actions of the prosecutor in these early cases certainly call the impartiality of the 
institution into question. Some would argue his failures constitute outright negligence, but it is 
possible to find that Moreno-Ocampo was acting out of necessity: using the governments of state 
parties to collect data and ensure the prosecution of criminal leaders. State parties referred these 
cases, and the prosecutor was acting in his role as prosecutor to garner a conviction. Indeed, 
Moreno-Ocampo was forced to ally himself with governments that abuse rights, but did so in 
order to successfully prosecute individuals who had committed crimes against humanity. It 
would be difficult to say now that justice for Lubanga and impunity for Kabila is worse than 
complete impunity for both, but in the long term, the legitimacy and moral standing of the Court 
will be at stake in these circumstances. The Court cannot hope to end impunity and deter crimes 
if those states that cooperate are routinely given effective immunity. The ICC is an institution 
built to distribute justice both to the victors and the defeated parties: it must give each side their 
just due if it is to show itself to be truly independent.  
 Fortunately, the independence of the Court seems to be improving given additional 
international aid and efforts to bring criminals to justice. The United States passed the “Rewards 
for Justice” act in late 2012, which provides financial incentives for information that leads to the 
apprehension of a perpetrator wanted by “an international criminal tribunal”. The United States 
also turned over Bosco Ntaganda, an associate of Lubanga who has been wanted since 2006, to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Court in recent weeks.180 Additionally, the U.S. Federal Government provided 100 special 
forces soldiers to train and assist Ugandan military units seeking to capture Joseph Kony.181 Aid 
similar to this on the part of member states and other countries would be instrumental in the 
development of the ICC, and would help to establish the credible threat of arrest and prosecution 
by the Court. Aid to this point has been relatively inconsistent, especially given the economic 
turmoil occurring all over the world and the political climate following the United States’ 
intervention in the Middle East. Despite these concerns, state parties must recognize their duties 
to the international community, and provide these resources if reasonably able to do so.  
 Maryam Jamshidi, an international legal scholar, sought to offer a means to promote 
compliance amongst member nations in a recent article for Al Jazeera. She notes that if a state 
proved unwilling to meet its obligations to the Court, that state could be brought before the 
International Court of Justice, which could demand compliance. ICJ decisions would be binding, 
and thus would force state parties to act “regardless of inconvenience or immediate self-
interest”.182 If the ICC could force its states to uphold Article 59, Section 1 of the Rome Statute, 
the Court could apprehend perpetrators at a much higher rate, and could legitimately deter crimes 
against humanity in the future. However, using the ICJ would appear to be inefficient for both 
courts: the ICJ has a limited docket of cases and the ICC needs to arrest perpetrators as quickly 
as possible. Nevertheless, the Court needs a means to compel its state parties to uphold their 
obligations, and bringing those governments before the ICJ is one potential way to achieve this 
end.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The final question on the efficacy of the Court is much broader, and concerns the overall 
theory of prosecution in contrast to other methods of reconciliation. In practice, this dichotomy 
was significant in Kony’s peace talks with the Ugandan government under Museveni. While the 
Ugandan government offered amnesty to any LRA soldiers who came forward, its referral to the 
ICC put the case within the Court’s jurisdiction. The ICC’s decision to maintain its demands for 
Kony caused peace talks to collapse. Opponents of the Court have claimed since its inception 
that the promise of prosecution could galvanize leaders to stay in power rather than accepting an 
agreement that would provide them exile. In practice, the impact on prosecutions has been less 
certain. On one hand, Kony remains at large because the maintained threat of sanctions. On the 
other, those sanctions drove Kony from Northern Uganda, which led to the end of many 
atrocities the LRA perpetrated on the people in that region.183 This could easily be considered a 
victory for the Court, as it was able to protect citizens in Uganda from Kony’s forces at the mere 
threat of prosecution.  
 However, the legitimacy of the Court relies not only on the ability to prosecute these 
leaders, but also the justice and healing promoted by the criminal tribunals. Tim Allen details 
that many Ugandan leaders, particularly religious authorities, were in favor of ending the 
prosecution. One leader, known to Allen as Father Carlos, said in 2004, “It would be better to 
have a truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa. The whole aspect should just be 
investigated.”184 While Father Carlos did not deny the ability of the ICC to diffuse the situation 
in Uganda, he continued to believe that the accountability should be handled according to 
traditional customs rather than by international prosecution. A 2005 article by Noah Weisbord 
relays similar arguments, claiming, “[W]ithdrawal by the ICC would not mean the end of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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accountability, they argue, but the beginning of indigenous justice processes.”185 If cultural 
traditions truly interfere with the cases the ICC seeks to prosecute, then a tremendously difficult 
dynamic emerges. In most situations, it would seem to be the responsibility of the state 
government to recognize these opposing ideologies and to refrain from submitting to the Court or 
referring a case to it. Yet, the ICC is obligated to fulfill its mandate and prosecute the worst 
offenders. While the Court can decide not to prosecute “in the interests of justice”, it seems that 
those cases would be reserved for extreme situations only.186  
However, despite the popular sentiment that ICC prosecution was endangering the 
religious traditions of the Ugandan people, particularly the Acholi, this did not seem to be the 
case in actuality.187 After extensive interviews across the country, including many in 
displacement camps, Allen determined that the general population, while less adamant than the 
religious leadership, was amenable to the prosecution of Kony and the other LRA 
commanders.188 It is impossible to say that there will never be a conflict between the values of a 
group and criminal proceedings, but Allen’s findings indicate that determining when these ideas 
contradict is at times more difficult than it appears. 
Prosecutor Bensouda recently put forth her belief that any peace long term necessitates 
justice and accountability. She claims that decisions in the past that have prioritized peace, and 
have allowed the perpetrators of crimes to escape liability have failed, and have entrenched 
cultures in continuous violence.189 Prosecution at very least offers the potential for a deterrent 
effect, while a truth commission offers freedom to the perpetrators and neglects justice for the 
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victims. Bensouda, while obviously biased based on her role with the International Criminal 
Court, does make an important point: peace has not been upheld in the long term in most areas 
that have refrained from prosecution. The leadership in these areas has settled out of fear and a 
belief that the crimes against their people will continue if an agreement is not reached. These 
leaders use a calculus that prevents atrocities in the short term but provides impunity for those 
responsible and thus no reason for these crimes not to occur again. The ICC has the ability to 
significantly alter this calculus. As a multinational institution, the Court has the ability to offer a 
continuous commitment to prosecution which could create change in the long run, and could 
prevent leaders from ever engaging in crimes against humanity on their citizens. It can serve 
justice to perpetrators who would not be prosecuted otherwise, and even assist in ending 
conflicts within and between nations. It will take significant action on the part of the prosecutor 
and the State Parties, but a powerful and effective International Criminal Court is a possibility in 
the near future.  
 The International Criminal Court is undoubtedly an imperfect institution, but it is one that 
nevertheless has tremendous potential. The early years of the Court were particularly difficult, 
characterized by uneven justice and mistakes that jeopardized prosecutions. The claims of bias 
were to a large degree inevitable; the Office of the Prosecutor had to establish priorities given the 
large number of cases that were referred to it. It remains to be seen whether or not the Court will 
allow itself to be used as a tool of State Parties in the future when justice is uncertain; the cases 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda were far from conclusive, and while Kony, 
Lubanga, and their respective followers warranted prosecution, the state regimes could have also 
been held accountable for similar crimes. The decisions of the prosecutor to distribute 
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prosecutions equally, and prioritize the worst crimes as opposed to the most convenient 
offenders, will be the most important factor in establishing the legitimacy of the Court. 
 It is possible that these inconsistent standards, along with the issues associated with the 
trials themselves, were indicative of Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and will not affect the Court under 
Fatou Bensouda and beyond. Nevertheless, the ICC must expand its prosecutions, both in 
number and location, in order to create accountability for offenders and potentially deter crimes 
in the future. Creating a new international culture that no longer tolerates impunity begins with 
guaranteeing prosecution, whether domestically or through the International Criminal Court. 
Even if the ICC does jeopardize peace in the short term, it provides a better opportunity for peace 
and security in the long run. 
 The most uncertain aspect of the Court will certainly be its ability to apprehend criminals. 
If states fail to fulfill the obligations requested of them by the prosecutor, and criminals continue 
to escape custody, the Court will have a minute deterrent effect, regardless of how many 
warrants it issues. The ability of the ICJ to bind nations to the Rome Statute is suspect, and even 
if it is possible, these demands would only be compulsory for member states. Thus, in order for 
the ICC to continue developing, states across the world must increase support for the Court. 
Much like the United States’ recent decision to provide military and financial assistance in hopes 
of apprehending international criminals, other national governments must seek to provide 
whatever assistance they can to aid the efforts of the Court. If states fail to expand support, and 
wanted suspects like Kony continue to exercise their freedom, observers across the world will 
lose their respect for the Court. In truth, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy, as claims of bias and 
injustice cause impartial states not to support the Court, which forces the prosecutor to undertake 
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only the most accessible cases, which leads to additional bias. A coordinated effort to help fulfill 
the Court and the prosecutor’s needs could help to alleviate these problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 As this paper understands human rights as a means to promote and protect human 
dignity, it was necessary to consider the several different theories of human rights and to 
determine which fit best with the ethical and political obligations of states in the international 
community. While cosmopolitanism is a rational standard based on the moral equality of human 
beings, it fails to recognize the role of the states in protecting human rights and primary 
obligations of governments to their own people. Pogge’s institutional model competently 
describes the role of the states and the responsibilities of individuals and institutions in correcting 
injustices in situations they participate in, but fails to translate well from the domestic level to the 
international arena. Beitz’s model understands rights as an obligation, a historical reality and a 
political goal, and recognizes the calculus that state governments must undertake in relation to 
their citizens and to the citizens across the globe. Beitz argues that a two-level system exists, in 
which states have primary obligations to their own citizens, and have obligations to international 
citizens when they can reasonably assist. The two-level model does not demand any certain 
action, and recognizes that the most effective way to fulfill international obligations is by 
creating and funding institutions built to promote human rights. 
 The International Criminal Court is one such institution. It was built as a permanent 
tribunal that could distribute justice to the worst criminals consistently, and could eventually 
curb crimes against humanity through deterrence. It would be unrealistic to say that the Court 
could do this alone, but it could certainly have an impact as a part of a wider effort to promote 
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human rights. As nations are significantly wary of submitting to higher authorities, the Rome 
Statute was carefully constructed over decades in order to be amenable to as many nations as 
possible. The representatives at the Conference put in place a number of safeguards so that the 
Court would have jurisdiction over the perpetrators of crimes against humanity while still 
maintaining the sovereignty of individual states.  
 The first cases of the Court have been difficult to undertake, as Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to appeal his case and Joseph Kony of the LRA 
remains at large. There were numerous mistakes over the length of the Lubanga trial, and the 
prosecution faced significant opposition during its attempts to apprehend Kony, as the LRA and 
Ugandan government attempted to forge a peace agreement. As the Court develops and garners 
respect from the international community, such problems should dissipate, but at this point any 
implications remain uncertain. A court with an expanded docket would almost certainly have 
more impact, but would also require more resources and demand additional aid on the part of 
state governments. If the international community is willing to fund the Court, it has the potential 
to be an institution with tangible impact on global human rights, both through deterrence and 
warrants for arrest in dangerous situations.  
 As such, the ICC would fit perfectly into Beitz’s model. The creation of this type of 
court, a secondary institution that respects national sovereignty but also takes real steps toward 
guaranteeing human rights globally, represents the type of initiative that Beitz described in his 
discussion of the secondary obligation. Once again, the Court could not protect all human rights 
on its own, but by fulfilling its mandate to end impunity, it could have a significant impact. As 
nations across the globe recognized that international accountability was a necessary mechanism 
for the protection of universal rights, they created the ICC as an institution that would fulfill that 
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need. It would serve to provide a minimum standard of justice, and vindicate the victims of 
genocide and crimes against humanity across the world. The International Criminal Court has not 
been that institution in its first decade, but could certainly develop into that role with the proper 
support from the international community.  
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